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Abstract: 
On November 18, 1864, the death knell of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom was rung.  
Hong Tiangui Fu had been killed.  Hong, divine leader of the once nascent kingdom and son of 
the Heavenly Kingdom’s founder, was asked to confess before his execution, making him one of 
the last figures to speak directly on behalf of the Qing’s most formidable opposition.  The 
movement Hong had inherited was couched in anti-Manchu sentiment, pseudo-Marxist thought, 
and a distinct, unorthodox, Christian vision.  The Taiping Civil War resulted in the death of as 
many as thirty million people, altering East Asian power dynamics for years to come.  Interested 
in this new reality, the Western world listened intently to the Young Monarch’s last words. 
Depositions have a long history in imperial tradition.  They were collected by courts to 
confirm the identity of those who broke the law and to indict them for their crimes against the 
dynasty.  These documents were also used to collect information on opposition movements, 
giving Qing rulers a more comprehensive vision of those attempting to bring them down.  Thus, 
the deposition resulting from Hong’s confession fit within an established legal genre.  Unlike 
those composed by members of previous uprisings, Hong’s confession circulated well beyond 
court archives and into the hands of foreign publications.  Commentators eagerly translated and 
edited the document for their extensive audience, placing their interpretations at the core of 
foreign debate about the conflict’s legitimacy.  The Western public was intrigued by the prospect 
of a new Chinese kingdom founded on Christian beliefs, and no one could tell this kingdom’s 
story better than those who had lived in it. 
This thesis changes our understanding of the process through which Taiping depositions 
were created and utilized.  Challenging previous scholarly assumptions that approached these 
documents as mere tools for factual reconstruction, this work argues that court depositions 
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played a vital political role in shaping contemporary perceptions of Qing rule and of its 
opposition movements.  More specifically, previous scholarly discussions on Taiping depositions 
are frozen in colonial and Cold War narratives, as those debating their value fail to understand 
that depositions were products of personal and communal ambitions.  These authors perceive 
these documents as static indicators of a movement’s character, to be used to legitimize or 
damage the narrative deployed by their respective political alignment.  By analyzing the 
depositions written by Taiping leaders Hong Daquan, Li Xiucheng, and Hong Rengan, in 
addition to any subsequent edits, Western reactions, and larger political concerns surrounding 
them, this thesis examines the role depositions played in determining external perceptions of the 
Taiping.  In following the lifespan of these documents, as opposed to judging their character, a 
greater understanding of their impact is revealed. 
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Introduction: 
The Context 
 On November 18, 1864, the death knell of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom was rung.  
Hong Tiangui Fu had been killed.1  Hong, divine leader of the once nascent kingdom and son of 
the Heavenly dynasty’s founder, could no longer outrun the forces of the Qing empire.  The 
Junior King of Heaven, whose practical reign had not even surpassed five weeks, was given time 
to confess before his execution by slow slicing commenced.  His age, amounting to only 
fourteen, combined with the isolated lifestyle he was forced to live resulted in a deposition 
containing little insight into the workings of the kingdom.  The document veers in too many 
directions, from Hong’s desire as a child to see his mother and sisters, to his plan to accompany 
the man who sheltered him during his escape, Assistant District Director of Studies Tang 
Jiadong, to Hunan in hopes of sitting for the imperial examinations.2  The majority of the 
deposition the court put together from Hong’s confession describes the end of his journey.  
Readers follow Hong from his premonition predicting the entrance of Qing soldiers into Nanjing 
to his flight from the city with the rest of the Taiping leadership, an escape that required him to 
abandon much of his family.  Whether Hong had been feigning confusion in hopes of gaining a 
pardon, legitimately thinking he would be allowed to live under Qing rule, or simply did not 
comprehend what had occurred to him and his people over the previous few days is entirely 
uncertain.  A translation of the completed deposition, despite its lack of new material, was 
published in full in the North China Herald on July 22, 1865.  What purpose did the release of 
                                                          
1 Hong was also called Hong Fu Tian in Western and Qing records. 
 
2 Franz H. Michael and Chung-li Chang, The Taiping Rebellion: History and Documents. 
Vol. 3. 3 vols. (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 1971), p. 1532. 
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Hong’s deposition serve, and what message did it send to the paper’s English-speaking 
audience?  The piece existed in a public space because it helped to secure the vision the Qing 
dynasty hoped to present to its Western counterparts.  Just as they had done during the war, Qing 
rulers hoped to use the very words of their enemies to procure foreign support, hoping to calm 
concerns and possibly relieve Western nations’ involvement in the region. 
 The Taiping Civil War, a conflict rooted in religious ideals and ethnic strife, began in 
1850.3  The Taiping were not the only group to resist Qing rule in their time, but they did put a 
greater strain on the empire than any attempts had before them.  Although large-scale violence 
between the Taiping and Qing would not commence until the Society of God-Worshippers 
officially declared itself to be loyal to a new kingdom in January of 1851, the movement’s roots 
can be traced back as early as 1837.  In this year, after failing to earn a shengyuan degree for the 
third time, Hong Xiuquan returned to his home in Guangdong, where he would suffer from a 
series of fever dreams.  Unable to interpret these, life continued as it had before, until a 
happenstance encounter in 1843 brought Hong face to face with Good Words to Admonish the 
Age.  The document was a Protestant tract written by Liang Fa, another Guangdong native who 
had converted to Christianity around a half-century prior.  Liang spent his adult life successfully 
disseminating Christian texts to new believers throughout Asia.  Soon after, accompanied by his 
new understanding of his self-proposed religious role and a small group of believers, Hong 
                                                          
3 As argued by Tobie Meyer-Fong in the first chapter of her 2013 book, What Remains, 
this thesis will refer to the central conflict as the Taiping Civil War, not the more commonly used 
Taiping Rebellion.  This serves to “[eliminate] implicit value judgments and [transcend] the 
totalizing political and moral narratives that emphasize national priorities over individual and 
collective suffering” as stated on p. 11.  In doing so Meyer-Fong affirms the decision Stephen 
Platt’s made in his book, Autumn in the Heavenly Kingdom, published the year before. 
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travelled throughout his home province and the nearby Guangxi in hopes of finding converts, 
finally settling in the Thistle Mountains. 
Around the time the Taiping left their natural stronghold and began to make the trek 
alongside the Yangzi River, a journey which would eventually bring them to Nanjing, some 
estimates claim that the group had garnered up to a half a million followers.4  The movement was 
made up primarily of those of Hakka descent.  The Hakka, meaning “guest people,” are a sub-
ethnic minority who historically had a tense relationship with both the Manchu-led Qing and the 
more populous Han Chinese.  The movement was bolstered by members of Tiandihui (天地會) 
and other discontented subjects hoping to hurry the demise of the Qing.5  Many of these new 
recruits were attracted by the Taiping message, now expanded to be explicitly anti-Qing and 
Manchu, just as much as they were interested in seeing this new Taiping religion at work, an 
increasingly divergent Christian faith.  Among some of the elements that would attract China’s 
less privileged classes to Taiping territory were rumors of land redistribution, some form of 
gender equality, and a ban on opium, the drug that had set the stage for many events of the 
nineteenth century.  It was the existence of these policies that also contributed to the fear many 
foreigners and Qing loyalists would develop toward the Heavenly dynasty in the coming years.  
The violence resulting from the kingdom’s efforts, which would affect the entire Qing empire in 
some capacity, ended in 1864 with the fall of Taiping-occupied Nanjing.  Between twenty and 
thirty million people lost their lives through direct violence or resulting famine and destruction, 
                                                          
4 Stephen R. Platt, Autumn in the Heavenly Kingdom: China, the West, and the Epic Story 
of the Taiping Civil War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2012), p. 16. 
 
5 Tiandihui, translated as Heaven and Earth Society, sometimes known in the West as 
Triads, were localized secret societies who originally existed as an attempt to restore the Ming 
dynasty, but often found themselves engaged in illegal activity or serving as paid protection for 
their respective communities. 
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with many regions suffering up to a fifty percent decrease in their population size.6  While the 
Taiping Heavenly Kingdom was ultimately unsuccessful in establishing a new Christian rule in 
Asia and expelling the Manchu-led Qing dynasty from its land, the kingdom’s efforts helped 
define a new power structure within Qing China.  The Taiping had successfully challenged 
Western expectations, redefining how these nations interacted with the Qing, as well as how 
foreign eyes percieved the relationships existing within the empire’s borders. 
The Sources 
Depositions collected by the Qing Court are some of the few sources available for 
understanding the Taiping movement through the words of its own members.  These documents 
had lives of their own, from their inception, to potential stages of editing, and finally 
interpretation.  This thesis will follow some of these documents throughout these various stages, 
confronting how their use evolved as their “life” pressed on.  The terms “deposition,” defined as 
the process of giving sworn evidence before the law, and “confession,” that of a formal 
admission of wrongdoing, typically in the context of religious belief, will be used 
interchangeably in this thesis.  They can be translated to Mandarin as gong (供) and zize (自责) or 
zisong (自訟) respectively.7  The original Chinese used to describe these documents is almost 
always deposition as opposed to confession, although both terms have long histories in Chinese 
tradition. 
                                                          
6 Tobie S. Meyer-Fong, What Remains: Coming to Terms with Civil War in 19th Century 
China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013), p. 1. 
 
7 Translations are taken from Philip A. Kuhn’s Reading Documents: The Rebellion of 
Chung Jen-chieh, p. 37 and Wu Pei-Yi’s “Self-Examination and Confession of Sins in 
Traditional China,” p. 5. 
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The terms confession and deposition only became conflated in the mind of readers upon 
translation.  Both have been used by scholars and contemporary viewers to describe the 
documents written by members of the Taiping movement.  Many translators opted for the term 
deposition when titling or describing their renditions.  This was most common in newspapers of 
the time, such as the North China Herald, whose translations would become the standard for 
many editions of these documents.  However, not all newspapers used the term “deposition,” 
with publications like The China Mail preferring to use “confession.”  Overall, “confession” was 
a much more popular term, chosen by individual observers like Lindesay Brine, regardless of the 
fact that depositions and confessions were not equivalent.8  This mistranslation has caused a 
great deal of improper reading and wayward analysis of depositions, as it added a religious layer 
to a primarily legal document.  In conjunction with the religious claims of the Taipings, Western 
eyes could not help but associate Judeo-Christian overtones with the depositions Taiping leaders 
would produce.  This would drastically alter the way these would be viewed, removing them 
from their original legal intentions.  Some commentators, like Augustus Lindley, chose to use 
both, shifting translations as they discussed different documents.9  Commentators who did this 
typically used varying terms to invoke differing opinions on the character of the deposition at 
hand.  Their choices, however, could be derived from the fact that those who gave testimony 
used the term “confession” to explain what they were doing.  This is because the act they 
engaged in was not deposition but confession.  Their words would not become depositions until 
                                                          
8 Lindesay Brine. The Taeping Rebellion in China; A Narrative of its Rise and Progress, 
Based Upon Original Documents and Information Obtained in China (London: J. Murray, 
1862), p. 131. 
 
9 Augustus F. Lindley, Ti-Ping Tien-kwoh; the History of the Ti-ping Revolution, 
Including a Narrative of the Author’s Personal Adventures (London: Day & Son, 1866), p. 771. 
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the people interrogating the author, usually in multiple sessions, consolidated these thoughts into 
a single, coherent document.10 
Chinese religious confessions can be dated back to the middle of the second century C.E.  
Early Daoist rituals, specifically the public acts of healing promoted by various secret societies, 
often required a confession of sin from the patient before the process of healing could begin.11  A 
written tradition of religious self-disclosure can be traced back to Buddhist documents from the 
sixth century, although the practice did not become widespread until the seventeenth.  The influx 
of Christian belief during the late Qing only further entrenched the notion of “confession” 
amongst new groups of converts.  Their numbers may have been small, many missionaries 
counting less than fifty longstanding Christian converts in their lifetime, but their presence was 
influential.12  The emergence of the Christian concept of confession may or may not have 
impacted the manner in which Taiping leaders wrote their depositions, and it certainly did not 
affect the way the Qing court collected depositions, but the concept actively impacted the way in 
which these documents were viewed by Western eyes.  A confession is an admission of sin, of 
wrongdoing.  In this light it would be difficult for those coming from a Christian background to 
have a positive reading of the documents that came into their possession.  These would be 
                                                          
10 See Appendix 1 of Susan Naquin’s Millenarian Rebellion in China and the entirety of 
Robert Hegel’s True Crimes in Eighteenth-Century China for examples of testimony prior to 
their consolidation into a deposition. 
 
11 Wu Pei-Yu, The Confucian’s Progress: Autobiographical Writings in Traditional 
China (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 1990), p. 209. 
 
12 As discussed on p. 16 of Platt’s Autumn in the Heavenly Kingdom, many missionaries, 
like Theodore Hamburg, preferred individual attention over mass conversion.  Platt notes that 
Hong Rengan converted between fifty and sixty converts in 1844, more than Hamburg ever did. 
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documents based in a failure to comply with religiously-imposed values and an expression of 
blasphemous crimes as opposed to an effort at redemption. 
Depositions were vital to the imperial understanding of Qing subjects and were in no way 
unique to the dynasty’s engagement with the Taiping.  Documents from between 1702 and 1809, 
later compiled and translated by Robert Hegel, shows that depositions collected from all kinds of 
criminal proceedings provided the court with similar data.13  For example, the Qing dynasty had 
collected confessions fifty-one years prior to the Taiping Civil War, during the Eight Trigrams 
Uprising of 1813.  The dynasty did the same as it fought Nian forces to the north of Taiping 
territory throughout the 1850s and 60s.  These documents served multiple purposes in the eyes of 
the imperial court.  Depositions provided information necessary to proving that those who had 
been caught were who they said they were.  By corroborating information extracted from other 
confessions and from field reports, the Qing court ensured that those responsible for the conflict 
were properly charged and punished.  This did not always go as intended.  A group of Nian 
insurrectionists managed to fabricate and hold to a distinct, concrete story when captured and 
interrogated, turning this central tool of the court against it.  When Zhang Lexing’s adopted son 
was questioned in 1859 on the fate of his father, a founder and prominent leader of Nian forces, 
“he testified that his father had fallen into an outer moat and drowned during a government 
offensive.”14  The same story was repeated by Nian troops captured in several other counties.  
With no evidence explaining otherwise, the Qing had no reason to think the story was anything 
                                                          
13 Robert E. Hegel, True Crimes in Eighteenth-Century China: Twenty Case Histories, 
Asian Law Series (Seattle: University of Washington Press. 2009). 
 
14 Elizabeth J. Perry, "When Peasants Speak: Sources for the Study of Chinese 
Rebellions." Modern China 6, no. 1 (1980): p. 82. 
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but true, when in reality Zhang Lexing was very much alive and leading Nian soldiery in 
continued resistance, which he would do until his passing four years later. 
What this anecdote on Nian resistance illustrates is the value that the imperial 
government placed in this form of testimony.  Managing an empire as vast as Qing China meant 
that the imperial court had no realistic mechanism for monitoring the population at large.  Served 
by a faltering Eight Banners and an increasing number of local militias whose allegiance was 
questionable, the only way to accrue an accurate account of the struggle between government 
and resistance was through the dissenters’ own words.15  The combination of these reports and 
the information gathered from their own forces allowed the Qing court to receive a 
comprehensive picture of what had occurred throughout a conflict, from the true extent of a 
movement’s sway amongst the population to the amount of damage done and the thought process 
behind the uprising.  By understanding the individual experiences that made up the conflict at 
large, the imperial court could do more than incriminate the individual actors propagating unrest. 
This new comprehension allowed the court to better address, fight back against, and properly 
respond to its subjects’ grievances. 
This form of evidence was collected through various methods of interrogation, often over 
the course of multiple sessions.  As mentioned earlier, there arose the problem of turning these 
potentially wide-ranging confessions into a single, coherent deposition.  This problem was not 
limited to the evidence within a deposition, but to the information collected throughout all the 
depositions representing a single event or subject.  Small details might vary, but a cohesive 
narrative had to prevail at the end of the day.  These methods of interrogation, to use a modern 
                                                          
15 The Eight Banners refers to the Qing dynasty’s standing army, an entity which had 
originally enabled the Qing’s victory over the Ming, but who had weakened significantly as the 
Taiping Civil War approached.  The name was derived from the group’s organizational structure. 
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euphemism, were often “enhanced” and were not always helpful in discerning truth from a desire 
to escape pain.  For example, a member of the Eight Trigrams had been forced to confess after an 
official ordered “smoke from burning coal and paper to be blown into [his] nose.”16  This order 
ultimately resulted in the man’s death.  Another official of the time was known to break the 
shinbones of his prisoners prior to interrogation.17  This reality must be taken into account when 
considering the validity of, and reasoning behind, any testimony given. 
Susan Naquin’s research on the depositions of the Eight Trigrams not only reveals the 
methods interrogators used but explains the reasoning behind their questions.  Her research 
assumes that most people would lie to minimize their own involvement or remove blame from 
their actions in an attempt to escape harsh punishment.18  As such, interrogations focused on the 
activities of others, creating a dynamic in which confessors emphasized the deeds of others and 
downplayed their own.  Other factors that may have affected the collection of depositions is the 
variety of dialects that officials would have encountered.  Especially concerning adherents of the 
Taiping movement, many of whom had travelled over three thousand li over the course of the 
war, deciphering their dialect and vocal quirks would not have been an easy task for officials 
who themselves might have come from a different region entirely.  In addition, according to 
historian Thomas Buoye, officials often underreported testimony which arose from violent 
conflict, out of fear that such reports would reflect badly on their capabilities.19  Whether or not 
                                                          
16 Susan Naquin, Millenarian Rebellion in China: The Eight Trigrams Uprising of 1813 
(New Haven: Yale University Press. 1976), p. 296. 
 
17 Ibid, p. 144. 
 
18 Ibid, p. 286. 
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this was possible during a conflict as widespread as the Taiping Civil War is difficult to say, but 
these patterns heavily informed the narratives that depositions revealed. 
Depositions collected during the Taiping Civil War were not entirely exceptional; in fact, 
stylistically they shared many elements with those that came before them.  Many Taiping 
depositions begin with a statement of identity.  This section establishes who the confessor is in 
relation to this person’s family, regional origins, and early life.  Depositions then relate the 
author’s time with the Kingdom, which would be used to properly evaluate the accused’s crimes 
against the court.  Finally, depositions end by either addressing the court or asserting that the 
previous statements made within them must be considered the truth.  This pattern can be seen in 
the first confession of Eight Trigrams member Chu Si, in which Chu begins by stating his home 
district, age, and immediate relations.  The next three paragraphs, as organized by Naquin, cover 
Chu’s first encounter with the Eight Trigrams, his attack planning with the organization, and his 
eventual journey to the capital, where he and his men were captured.  His confession ends with 
the statement “[t]his is the truth.”20  The next two confessions collected from him are similar in 
their content, which, alongside those collected from his compatriots, indicated “the reliability of 
such testimony.”21 
What was unique about the Taiping documents, however, was the audience to which they 
were advertised, or even the fact that they were advertised at all.  The length of each document 
also stands out.  A look into the previously mentioned depositions collected during the Eight 
                                                          
19 Thomas Buoye, Manslaughter, Markets, and Moral Economy: Violent Disputes over 
Property Rights in Eighteenth-century China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 
242. 
20 Naquin, Millenarian Rebellion in China, p. 272. 
 
21 Ibid, p. 271. 
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Trigram conflict shows that translated confessions rarely extended beyond two paragraphs, in 
contrast to the multi-page spanning Taiping confessions.  Archival analysis of Nian depositions 
shows that their circulation remained primarily within government circles.22  The audience of 
Taiping depositions was significantly wider than those of the Eight Trigrams conflict.  The fact 
that these documents were published in full English translations at all is notable.  It indicates that 
there were those who felt that there was some benefit to showing a foreign audience the inner 
thoughts of those heading the efforts of the Taiping movement.  This may be due to the 
movement’s Christian roots or the widespread damage it wrought.  Their length may be due to 
the extended reach, clearer goal, and stricter hierarchy possessed by the Taiping Heavenly 
Kingdom than the other opposition forces of the era.  It also indicates that there was more story 
to be told.  These narratives contained more influence over their respective conflict’s outcome 
than preceding depositions ever had. 
The practice of extracting confessions for government use is one that still exists today.  
An article from The New York Times, published in 2018, highlighted the way in which the 
Chinese Communist Party has used the confession to de-legitimize political enemies and advance 
state-approved narratives.  Televised confessions “are meant as warnings to others who would 
challenge the state, and to discredit accusations of abuses of power by the Communist Party or 
the state security organs.”23  This thesis will in no way attempt to equate the two practices or 
claim that the modern-day version is derived from the imperial version.  These practices may 
                                                          
22 Research done for this thesis did not find any evidence of the public circulation of Nian 
or Eight Trigrams depositions, nor was any evidence encountered via secondary sources.  This 
does not mean that these documents were not circulated, although it will be assumed until proven 
otherwise. 
 
23 Steven Lee Myers, “How Chinese Authorities Uses Forced Confession as a 
Propaganda Tool.” The New York Times (New York), April 12, 2018. p. A10. 
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overlap at times, but they differ in many ways as well, as the environment and history from 
which they emerged is vastly different. Articles like Myers’ simply provide readers with context, 
backing up the argument that confessions could be used in such a way. 
The purpose of this thesis is to re-contextualize the environment in which Taiping 
depositions came to be.  As opposed to viewing them as passive documents, exclusively used to 
reconcile data on behalf of the government, it will aim to establish depositions as a distinct 
political tool.  Previous scholarly debate on Taiping depositions has focused primarily on the 
information they contained.  This approach is useful, but only confronts half of the question at 
hand.  Recognizing that the content of depositions is not random allows a reader to use said 
document to round out their understanding of the perceptions both within and around the 
movement.  In order to properly understand the depth of these documents, one must take into 
consideration why this content was written down, and the process by which it was released into 
the hands of the public.  Perceiving these documents solely for their fact-checking abilities is a 
consequence of the political commitments of those who have studied them so far.  Although not 
directly related, an article from 1951 by Vincent Shih comparing interpretations of Taiping 
ideology by both communist and nationalist scholars of the time makes a noteworthy point.  
While Shih himself is most likely biased in his analysis as well, he acknowledges that each 
opinion was based in a desire to show that “the Taipings were no more than a band of rebels and 
that their society differed very little, if any at all, from traditional rebellions” or that “they were 
patriots and reformers and their movement was the forerunner of modern socialist and 
communist revolutions.”24  The political identity of the two parties vying for power was heavily 
                                                          
24 Vincent Y. C. Shih, "Interpretations of the Taiping Tien-Kuo by Noncommunist 
Chinese Writers." The Far Eastern Quarterly 10, no. 3 (1951): p. 256. 
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reliant on the connection these entities established with the movements of China’s past.  In the 
same manner that the Qing, and the dynasties before it, wrote histories of the preceding power, 
the Communist Party, the Kuomintang, and the Western world watching them all had motive in 
asserting one narrative as legitimate over another.  
Just like the secondary works discussing them, depositions were products of personal and 
communal ambitions.  They were affected by larger political concerns that confronted both the 
Qing and the Taiping and are thus a result of two camps battling over external perceptions of 
their conflict.  Taiping depositions are documents riddled with bias and driven by goals that were 
not always direct or clear.  This is due to the fact that each actor involved in writing, editing, and 
collecting them had an individual purpose to fulfill.  This combination of voices resulted in 
documents that provide glimpses at truth, but more interestingly they provide insight into the 
relationships between those involved.  By looking further into these relationships, scholars gain a 
more comprehensive understanding of the personal perspectives that made up each camp, rather 
than exclusively viewing the two groups from an outside, institutional perspective.  In addition, 
depositions allow scholars to consider and observe concerns held by both parties not directly 
relating to physical damage of the conflict at hand.  To analyze Taiping depositions without 
considering the elements of propaganda they contain, as most previous discussions have, is to 
misconstrue their role entirely.  The depositions collected by the imperial court during the 
Taiping Civil War were not used exclusively as evidence in court; rather, they existed as tools of 
narrative.  Their existence and prominent publishing in English differentiates them from 
depositions from previous conflicts, positioning them to influence the perception of the Taiping 
and Qing in Western eyes, and changing the course of their respective foreign relations. 
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Chapter 1: A False Confession and a Faked Execution 
The Qing Dynasty Makes Its Move 
The spring of 1852 was in many ways a turning point in Qing history.  The Taiping Civil 
War had begun to ravage much of the Chinese countryside over the previous two years.  As 
Taiping troops made their first territorial gains and entrenched themselves in their new mission, 
the leadership of the fledgling regime began to expand its vision of a Christian China.  
Garrisoned in the city of Yongan for the past six months, Hong Xiuquan’s forces were energized 
and ready to move.  It was during the small respite from marching that Yongan provided that 
Hong Xiuquan and his compatriots began to further expand their vision of a new dominion.  As 
the conflict between Taiping and Qing forces increased daily, Hong had no choice but to claim 
for himself the Mandate of Heaven, an action exemplifying the pinnacle of imperial ambitions.  
In response, the Qing dynasty was now forced to acknowledge the newly-christened “Taiping 
Heavenly Kingdom” as more than the ramblings of discontented outsiders.  Doing so, however, 
was a risk.  As the Qing continued to suffer under increasingly one-sided treaties forced upon it 
by European nations, the dynasty found a way to redefine the advent of the Taiping as not a 
symptom of its growing weakness, but as an example of its returning strength.  The long-
promised beginning of this new Taiping-ruled kingdom begat a search for an Earthly Paradise.  
As of April 5, Hong Xiuquan had left Yongan on a journey that would take him to his new 
capital at Nanjing, a place he would enter dressed in yellow robes.  Two days later, members of 
the Qing court declared that their attack on the Taiping rear had gone well. 25  They had captured 
Hong Daquan, Tian De, or Heavenly Emperor of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom. 
                                                          
25 The Taiping renamed the city Tianjing, which translates to Heavenly Capital.  The city 
has historical importance as it served as the capital of multiple dynasties, including but not 
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 According to Franz Michael, who compiled a significant number of translated Taiping 
documents, Tian De’s deposition first appeared in the public eye in English translation as a part 
of the Overland China Mail published on August 23, 1852.  It appeared in The China Mail three 
days later.26  These publications most likely came into possession of their variant the same way 
French expatriates Joseph-Marie Callery and Melchior Yvan, a missionary and politician 
respectively, did when putting together their contemporary history of the conflict.27  Originally 
published in 1853, Callery and Yvan wrote their translation when “the Official Gazette of 
[Beijing] published a decree by which [Tian De] was sentenced to undergo the extreme penalty 
of the law.”28  An article released by The China Mail on September 30, addressing the deposition 
published on August 26 confirmed this, stating that “[t]he confession was kept back by the 
translator for six weeks, and was not published until the order for [Tian De’s] execution appeared 
in the [Beijing] Gazette.”29  The more interesting discussion of The China Mail’s article is not to 
be found in the publication’s delay, but in the reasoning behind its author’s further exposition.  
The vision of Taiping structure and movement the paper had once provided their audience was 
no longer accurate. 
                                                          
limited to the Eastern Wu, Eastern Jin, and Southern Tang.  Most relevant is the Southern Ming 
dynasty, who established its capital there as it fled the advance of the emerging Qing dynasty. 
 
26 Michael and Chang. The Taiping Rebellion. Vol. 2. p. 188. 
 
27 This thesis quotes from the translation used by The China Mail.  It is interesting to note 
the differences between translations.  While the general form and information remains the same, 
authors often choose to word the deposition differently depending on their personal political 
preferences.  Less notable, but still curious is the fact that certain facts vary between translations, 
such as the date on which the Taiping captured the city of Yongan. 
 
28 Joseph-Marie Callery and Dr. Yvan, History of the Insurrection in China. trans. by 
John Oxenford (New York City: Paragon Books Reprint, 1969), p. 133. 
 
29 “The China Mail.” The China Mail (Hong Kong), September 30, 1852. p. 158. 
16 
 
 The second related issue of The China Mail, circulated on September 30, retracted all 
previous statements that may have implied the authenticity of said document.  Basing its decision 
on arguments forwarded by British missionary, Sir John William Bowring, and American 
physician, Peter Parker, the paper questioned “whether this [Hong]…was ever the [Tian De] of 
[Guangxi]?  [A]nd [if] not, whether the insurgents now have such a leader?”30  Having decided 
that the deposition was most likely forged to some extent, The China Mail struggled to 
understand why the Qing might have done such a thing.  An uncited source told the paper that it 
would have been quite unlikely that the Qing personnel responsible for Tian De’s supposed 
capture and transport to Beijing would have “taken the trouble to foist a scapegoat on the Prime 
Minister.”31  Neither could The China Mail understand what motive could have driven these 
imperial actors to frame the wrong man as a Taiping leader, seeing such a move as full of risk 
and causing short-lived relief at best, before they are found out.  In some capacity, by asking 
these questions, The China Mail proves that the Qing did have reason to fabricate such a 
document.  Suspicions of Qing forgery were not unfounded.  From the time The China Mail 
originally published its translation, up until the publication’s subsequent retracting of its 
endorsement of the documents’ authenticity, the Qing could gain critical time in planning its next 
move.  The imperial court could only benefit from incurring conversation around the motives 
and actions of the Taiping themselves as this would delay Western involvement on either side. 
One reason why the authenticity of Tian De’s deposition mattered was that it made 
claims central to the legitimacy of the Christian adherence of the movement.  A key segment of 
the deposition stated that Hong Xiuquan “had relied upon his magical arts for assistance” and 
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that “he was both a wine-bobber and a licentious man, having thirty-six women with him.”32  
Such an attack by a supposedly-high ranking Taiping official might not have inferred anything 
about the movement’s progress or successes, but it did speak to the unorthodoxy of its people’s 
Christian belief.  Talk of Hong’s surmised harem would be a contentious topic of discussion for 
years to come.  Marriage practices played a vital role in The Taeping as They Were, a document 
written by “One of Them” and published in 1864.  The pamphlet, which took an overwhelmingly 
positive point of view on the movement, found in their marriage practices evidence of their 
religious piety and overall compliance with Western moral standards.33  This questioning of the 
basic moral stance of Taiping leadership, in addition to an earlier mention of Hong’s consorting 
with demons, seriously put into question any arguments made by Protestant missionaries on 
behalf of their new Christian kin. 
The deposition of Tian De takes advantage of the ambiguity that accompanied the 
translation of both language and cultural concepts.  The deposition’s use of “devils” may just as 
well have been referring to the Taiping leadership’s willingness to collaborate with foreigners as 
much as it could have implied the summoning of ghosts, demons, and other figures deemed 
heretical to a Western, Judeo-Christian audience.  The difficulty of translating cultural concepts 
worked heavily in the imperial court’s advantage, allowing the document to mean two different 
things to two groups of people, and do damage to the Taiping reputation regardless.  Similarly 
confusing to Western audiences was Chinese naming convention.  The fact that Hong Xiuquan 
and Hong Daquan share a family name was a source of confusion for many Western viewers, 
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33 “One of Them.”, The Taepings as They Were. (London: Arthur Hall, Smart & Allen, 
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especially for those whose exposure to the language was limited and filtered through 
transliteration.  That both of their political titles contained the character for heaven did not make 
distinguishing between the two any easier.  Of course, Chinese commentators may just have 
easily confused the two names and titles, and any confusion on their behalf would have only 
made the task of translating and then understanding much more difficult. 
The China Mail was seemingly uninterested in addressing a question central to 
understanding the purpose of Taiping depositions.  Who were the intended readers of these 
documents?  While the following chapter in this thesis will consider the depositions of dissidents 
to be primarily aimed toward an active, foreign audience, there were more factors at play this 
early in the Taiping conflict.  Just as the Qing had hoped to assuage foreign fears and persuade 
Western powers to at least stay neutral, if not become pro-Qing, the same work had to have been 
done for the Chinese elite, a group of people whose role in imperial society was rapidly 
transforming.  According to Jonathan Spence, the Qing controlled over five million square miles 
of territory at the beginning of the nineteenth century.34  The empire’s borders might have 
adjusted slightly by the start of the Taiping Civil War, but the point persists: the Qing empire 
was vast, and information travelled slowly.  The first few years of conflict found its direct 
consequences fairly contained.  Violence was limited to southern provinces like Guangxi and 
Hunan, and even then, was focused more narrowly on regions around both the Xiang River and 
West River basin.  Just as the West was limited in its understanding of the Taiping due to 
geographic constraints, so were the majority of Qing commoners and gentry.  At this point, 
Taiping doctrine was still forming and a mystery to most outsiders.  Unless Qing officials could 
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successfully assert a narrative of Taiping ideology in line with their own understanding of the 
movement, the dynasty feared losing the support of those who provided them with both their 
financial base and political strength on a local level. 
The deposition of Tian De neutralized these potential political threats in a few ways.  The 
deposition praised the military prowess of individual generals; perhaps as a rhetorical strategy 
inflating the impressiveness by which the Qing had caught Tian De and routed the rest of his 
army.  At the same time, it painted the overall hierarchical structure of the Taiping in a much 
more negative light.  Tian De stated that “[i]n action, whoever backed out was executed, and 
their officers severely punished[.]”35  The deposition’s introduction similarly set a disapproving 
tone.  In it, Tian De indirectly declared himself to be a guanggun (光棍), a term often used in 
Chinese history to describe wandering, unattached men.  The increase in unattached men, or 
“rootless rascals,” was not a welcomed reality in the nineteenth century.  Edicts imposed by both 
the Qianlong and Jiaqing emperors, fifth and sixth emperors of the Qing dynasty, specifically 
targeted guanggun, blaming them for what these rulers saw as a destruction of Confucius 
values.36  Elites of the period believed that these guanggun “ruptured the boundaries of the 
household and threatened to violate the women (and young boys) within.”37  With this in mind, 
the picture the deposition of Tian De sketched was not one of a rising freedom force, here to 
expel China’s oppressors, but a group of unsuccessful and now angry men.  This was a group to 
be feared, a group that would not give the current class of literati or the newly established 
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36 Matthew H. Sommer, Sex, Law, and Society in Late Imperial China (Stanford, Calif.: 
Stanford University Press. 2000), p. 353. 
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merchant elite greater political and financial power, but one that would turn on them as quickly 
as they might have welcomed them in.  Another facet of the confession is the state in which it 
left the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom.  By the very fact of Tian De’s capture, in conjunction with 
his recollection of how he had last seen the Taiping forces, readers saw a group of scattered 
rebels forced to run away.  It is as if the Qing had managed to pose its inconclusive victory, 
evident by Tian De’s mention of the survival of Hong Xiuquan and other vital Taiping leaders, 
as a penultimate blow landed on a soon to be irrelevant enemy. 
The Façade Manifests 
The performance of power is an activity the Qing dynasty had been well versed in at this 
stage of its ruling career.  One way in which the imperial court showcased this expertise during 
the events surrounding Tian De’s deposition was through his execution.  Jian Youwen, a 
prominent scholar from the Republic of China and at one point, a pastor, notes the “considerable 
fanfare” that accompanied Hong’s capture and travel to Beijing.38  Whether intentional or not, 
Tian De’s capture had become a performance on the imperial stage.  Lindesay Brine, an author 
and member of the British Royal Navy, provides his readers with a closer look into the 
execution, quoting from the Board of Punishments at Beijing.  “‘The [Guangxi] rebel chief 
…was put to death by being slowly cut into small pieces…and his head was exposed as a 
warning to all.’”39  Why celebrate in such a tremendous fashion if the war had not yet been won?  
The dynasty may have used this as an opportunity to discourage further resistance, like they had 
done during the Eight Trigrams Uprising, or to exude an air of confidence.40  Later doubts on the 
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39 Brine, The Taeping Rebellion in China, p. 130. 
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identity of Tian De strengthen claims of performance on behalf of the Qing dynasty, who easily 
could have used a random figure to reach its end goal.  Take the southern inspection tours of the 
Kangxi and Qianlong emperors as examples of the dynasty’s performative history.  While these 
journeys, six for each emperor, did allow the emperor to personally survey his empire, in effect 
they were much more about strategic presentation and consolidation of outside belief than they 
were anything else. 
The Qing are not unique in this, as performing power is prevalent in all government 
histories.  Japan historian William Coaldrake points to the process of shikinen sengu (式年遷宮), a 
rebuilding process, as a display of government performance.  This process involved the 
periodical renewing of important Shinto shrines from the ground up; it was an action that 
required a great number of resources and laborers.  Through these construction projects the 
presiding Japanese emperor could emphasize his connection to the heavens and remind the 
people around the shrine of his power.  They did this by both engaging a large section of the 
populace in a labor project as well as by creating an enduring monument to the emperor’s 
authority.41 
The performativity of Tian De’s execution becomes exceptionally notable after looking at 
the two depositions featured in the next chapter of this thesis.  Both depositions were published 
around the closing of the war, during, or immediately after the snuffing out of the largest Taiping 
threat to the imperial court.  In addition, both depositions came from confirmed leaders of the 
Taiping, leaders who were in no way peripheral figures.  These were, in the eyes of the forces 
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who followed them, the armies that resisted them, and the Western eyes who watched them, the 
two central figures in the later stage blossoming of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, without 
whom the movement would not have survived as long as it did.  There was no celebration 
accompanying the capture of these leaders.  The first, Li Xiucheng, was executed, somewhat 
surreptitiously, before his captors even reached Beijing.  The second, Hong Rengan, was left to 
seethe in the presence of the “Manchu devils” he so despised for an entire month, forced to read 
the depositions of those caught before him, before he was executed quietly less than a week after 
the death of his sovereign.  The prominence the Qing attributed to the performative execution of 
Tian De does not inherently inform an audience on the dynasty's motives for doing so.  While the 
contrast between the events surrounding the lives of these depositions is notable, it may very 
well be explained by the difference in circumstances and contemporary relations surrounding the 
events.  At this stage, the Qing had to convince the entire world to fight alongside it, whereas 
later on the dynasty only had to prove that this decision to do so had been the right one.  This 
aspect of Tian De’s deposition speaks to the fact that these documents were used as much more 
than just archival court evidence.  They were not meant to be lost in a sea of records within a 
government gazette, but to be broadcast far and wide.  Depositions were a singular, yet 
important, element of a larger effort at promoting Qing success. They were vital to encouraging 
the stability of current rule through the assertion of a dynasty-approved narrative. 
An Imposter’s Disguise 
The confession credited to Tian De followed the standard format attributed to imperially-
collected depositions prior to the Taiping Civil War, as discussed in this thesis’ introduction.  For 
sake of analysis, it can be divided into three distinct sections.  The document begins with a 
declaration of identity, in which Tian De recounted his familial connections, geographic origins, 
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and early history.  The purpose of this section in most depositions was to assist the members of 
the court in confirming that the identity of the prisoner in question was the same as the one they 
aimed to prosecute.  The middle of the deposition consisted of a telling of Tian De’s joining up 
with the Taiping forces, and his subsequent actions while amongst them.  This included his rise 
to power.  The point of this was to determine what crimes against the empire the deliverer 
perpetrated so that the court might properly condemn and sentence said prisoner.  This 
information also gave the court a clearer picture of what was actually occurring throughout the 
realm by allowing it to compare and contrast what its members have been told with more formal 
reports.  The final section of Tian De’s deposition served as an indication of Taiping motives.  It 
is here that Tian De formally separates himself from the rest of the movement.  He revealed 
himself as an individual and independent actor, one whose goals did not align with the Taiping 
movement as a whole. 
In a move that contradicts statements from his first paragraph, where he admits to 
studying military strategy after failing his examinations several times, Tian De states: “I wore a 
yellow robe, and I did not of my own will desire to sit on the king’s throne.”42  What to the 
uninitiated eye may come across as a vain recognition of fashion choice was in reality a 
denunciation of Taiping goals.  Historically, yellow had been the exclusive domain of the 
imperial lineage.  Hong Xiuquan may have called himself the Heavenly King, but by donning 
yellow clothing he clearly denoted himself as an emperor, poised to directly challenge the 
legitimacy of over two centuries of Qing rule.  Context for this statement is provided in the 
previous few sentences, in which the persona of Tian De listed a large number of Taiping leaders 
who were similarly clad in yellow, establishing that the entire Taiping populace used the color.  
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The translated sentence, which is admittedly worded a bit confusingly, has more than one level 
of complexity to it.  Translated differently by Franz Michael the sentence reads as follows: 
“[w]hile in the official residence, I also had a yellow robe and a yellow cap.  Since I did not 
uphold myself as a wang, nor sit at court, I did not wear them.”43  This variety of available 
translation can be seen in many other places, such as the contemporaneous Callery and Yvan 
history.  These differences do not change the content of the deposition; rather, they shift the tone 
of the document, adjusting its words to better align with the translator’s political leanings. 
If this deposition had in fact been put together by officials in Beijing in hopes of 
controlling outside perspectives on the conflict, what did they gain from separating Tian De from 
the rest of the movement?  What was the reasoning behind portraying him as less committed to 
the end goal?  This image presented foreign readers with a Taiping Kingdom that had not yet 
found its direction, a kingdom who had, to invoke the rhetoric of naming discussed by Stephen 
Platt and Tobie Meyer-Fong, been made up of bickering, imploding rebels rather than a strong-
willed and focused young kingdom.  The excerpt also relayed the fact that this new power may 
not be as receptive to a dominating West as some nations hoped the Taiping would be.  With 
“secular” moderates like Tian De and the triad faction he supposedly represented out of the 
picture, no one was left to push back against Hong Xiuquan’s radical utopian path.  This newly-
concentrated Taiping would be much more difficult to deal with than the subdued Qing dynasty 
that had been working with the West at that moment.  Of course, this would only be a reality 
provided the dynasty did not remove the Taiping threat soon, which with a bout of arguably 
unwarranted confidence, it promised to do. 
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Tian De’s unwillingness to wear the robes of an emperor is not the only way in which the 
man separated himself from the rest of his cohort.  His lack of belief in the religious element of 
the Taiping mission is never directly stated, but it is heavily implied throughout the deposition’s 
writing.  It is particularly evident in the document’s second paragraph, which finds Tian De 
berating the central Taiping leadership’s claim to divine origin as such: “[w]ith these flaming 
words [Hong Xiuquan and Feng Yunshan] beguiled the members of the association, so that none 
of them left it.”44  This emphasis on Tian De’s lack of religious fervor would become important 
to many critics of the Taiping later on, and at the time was vital in defining perceptions of the 
movement.  Commentary from The China Mail from the same issue, focused on the fate of a 
town in Guangxi and another in Hunan, addresses this perception.  “It would appear that bands of 
dispersed insurgents…have been committing great excesses wherever they have come, sparing 
neither the lives nor property of those who fall into power.”45  The paper was convinced that 
those at the ground level of the Taiping are only ever changed from “their former condition of 
marauding banditti” by the sheer will power of those leading them, who in turn only did so out of 
“a desire to win the people’s confidence.”46  This concern about the behavior of Taiping troops is 
connected to Tian De’s feelings toward Taiping Christianity.  In conjuncture with the image of a 
soon to be unified radical leadership, The China Mail’s message was that if Tian De and the 
other reports the paper had collected were to be believed, should the Taiping movement begin to 
gain any more momentum than it already had it would become a force to truly fear.  The 
deposition’s construction of Tian De exploited the distance between the various camps making 
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up the Taiping.  The conflict between Tian De’s moderates, who used the Christian faith as a 
mere unifier, and the religious extremists following Hong Xiuquan, undermined the legitimacy 
of the movement.  The deposition had created the perfect enemy, a group made up of 
opportunists rather than freedom fighters, a group of Christian imposters rather than soldiers of 
Heaven.  In this way the imperial court hoped to enlist the assistance of Western nations who 
might have otherwise come to the aid of these newly-Christened brethren. 
Perceptions of the Truth 
“This confession is true.”47  Thus concludes each translation of Hong Daquan’s 
deposition, just as many had ended before his and as Hong Tiangui Fu’s deposition would end 
twelve years later.  Of course, as this chapter has shown, not everyone believed this to be the 
case.  The previously mentioned Callery and Yvan were not subdued in their passionate support 
of the Taiping by the document, rather they had grown more inflamed by this “perfidious 
intention to compromise the Christians.”48  According to the authors, the deposition was the 
product of politicians in Beijing and a part of a larger attempt to discredit Christianity and 
convince the West of the consequences that would result from Taiping success.  This notion that 
a victorious Taiping Kingdom would rid its ports of foreign influence and bar any access to the 
region was a common thread amongst Qing propaganda efforts, one that was based on an already 
rampant fear.  Ironically enough, Stephen Platt points out that the eventual result of the Qing 
victory was essentially the same.  The Qing may not have passed any laws banning foreign trade, 
but peace lacked the economic stimulus that the war had provided.  The conflict had acted as a 
stimulus, favoring the safety foreign merchants could provide.  The end of the war resulted in a 
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mass exit of investments in foreign services and significant financial downturns.49  Confessions 
like that of Tian De’s could not predict which outcome would best suit foreign nations, but they 
did allow for foreign politicians to gather the evidence they needed to argue for one side or the 
other. 
Thomas Meadows, an English author and interpreter for the British consulate in 
Guangzhou, ardently believed that Hong Xiuquan and his followers were the next in a series of 
revitalizing forces “that can clear the political atmosphere when it has become sultry and 
oppressive” just as the Manchus had once been to the Ming dynasty.50  In his comprehensive 
study on the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, informed by his own experiences in China, Meadows 
did not seriously take into account the possibility of a Tian De.  Relegating the conversation to a 
single footnote halfway through the book’s over six hundred pages, Meadows asserted that any 
debate over Tian De was the result of a translation mishap.  “[T]he sinologue will readily 
perceive how the mandarin-pronouncing Imperialist Officers would fall into the error of 
substituting [Tian De] for [Tian Gui], and consider it the title adopted by the rebel leader.”51  
Meadows ended his footnote by reiterating to his readers that they must not take the proposition 
of a Tian De seriously.  There never was a man named Hong Daquan.  Even if there was, any 
connection to or a power equivalent to that of Hong Xiuquan he claimed to have was based in 
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“the desire to die as a person of importance,” or a result of the torture to which he must have 
been subjected.52 
As a contemporary observer, his book published the same year that rumors of Tian De 
began to circulate, Meadows was in no place to speak on the impact of such a potentially false 
deposition.  His commentary does, however, emphasize that people believed there to be an 
importance in understanding the role Tian De claimed to play, and what that resulted in for an 
understanding of Taiping hierarchy.  Meadows might not have had more to say on the subject, 
but what he did have to say assumed that the confusion born out of the deposition of Tian De had 
a role in defining the kingdom’s narrative as seen by the Western world.  This assumption 
proved true down the line, as authors like the previously mentioned Lindesay Brine continued to 
discuss the fate of Tian De.  Brine, while opposed to Meadows’ belief that Tian De never 
existed, left his stance slightly more open to convincing.  Brine weighed the arguments for both 
possibilities before securing his allegiance to a specific interpretation.  He was impressed with 
the trove of knowledge Tian De seemed to possess about the affairs of other Taiping leaders and 
Taiping actions in general, his knowledge reconciling imperial, Taiping, and independent 
reports.  That his existence falls in line with previous rumors Brine had heard, specifically those 
of a priest who claimed to descend from the Ming and had recently been strategically promoted 
to the rank of emperor within the Taiping camp, only furthered his convictions.  This in turn 
helps explain why the Taiping counted years as Tian De one, or Tian De two before they entered 
Nanjing, as it was tradition in dynastic history to refer to the year by the reign date of the 
presiding emperor.  Furthermore, Brine believes that the risk those faking a confession would 
have run would have been too high, and would have been rather impractical, just as The China 
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Mail originally believed.  The immediacy of Tian De’s transportation to Beijing only enhances 
this perspective.  Brine gave credence, although not as much, to evidence pointing toward the 
possibility that Tian De was an imperial construct.  As such he finds the lack of mention of Tian 
De in any Taiping documents concerning.53  Brine, like Meadows, does not delve into the realm 
of consequences for Tian De’s existence, but the fact that he dedicates such space to the 
discussion of the figure even after the conflict has developed much further indicates that foreign 
observers felt that the truth of the situation held some sort of importance.  Observers paid 
attention to what was said in depositions, they placed weight in the messages these documents 
sent. 
A Goal Achieved 
Tian De’s deposition was a tool for maintaining status quo.  The document did more than 
just sow confusion about the goals and leadership of the Taiping movement, it declared the 
Christian conquest dead in its tracks.  Commentary from The China Mail’s discussion of the 
deposition noted that the document confirmed what other sources had already hinted at.  All 
information pointed to the reality that imperial forces “had been singularly successful in 
dispersing the insurgents: in so much that among the Canton Chinese, who have taken any 
interest in the matter, as well as by the better informed foreigners, the rebellion is regarded as 
checked, if not finished.”54  As history has shown, this assertion was anything but true.  It would 
be another twelve years before the Taiping officially fell to imperial forces in Nanjing.  What did 
Qing officials gain from promoting such a false view of Taiping progress?  They gained security.  
By spreading the false notion that the movement’s momentum had begun to sputter out, the Qing 
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dynasty hoped to influence core perceptions amongst the Western powers keeping track of the 
growing conflict.  The first perception was an assertion that everything within the dynasty’s 
borders was under control.  No foreign aid was needed in quelling unrest, seeing as the Qing was 
just as strong as it had ever been.  Whether the court’s subjects, or the court itself, actually 
believed that is doubtful, but the image of strength is often just as important as strength itself, 
especially when one’s audience is an ocean away.  Secondly, it calmed any growing fears that 
might be found in foreign nations who had invested or involved themselves in the affected 
regions.  Unrest meant potential for loss, both political and financial.  The deposition aimed to 
show Western nations that they need not fear for their own fates in Asia nor should they 
underestimate the capabilities of the dynasty.  If the Qing could convince the Western world that 
it had everything under control, the dynasty could decrease the risk of greater involvement and 
presence from Western nations, something the dynasty’s rulers already had more of than they 
would have liked.  Capturing the opposition’s leader was a drastic and effective way of doing 
this. 
To believe that around 1852 a Qing army had taken a man named Hong Daquan into 
custody for connections to the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom is not a significant stretch.  The more 
contentious aspect of the story surrounding this questionable deposition is what role this man 
actually played in the Kingdom, if he played a role at all.  This topic has been the primary focus 
of most discussions past scholars have engaged in revolving around the deposition of Tian De.  
While the nature of Tian De’s true identity is a vital aspect of scholarly debate, the domineering 
presence of this conversation tends to outweigh other critical elements of historical study.  For 
example, almost no discussion of the Taiping reaction, or more accurately the lack thereof, to 
Tian De’s capture and execution exists in the popular canon of Taiping studies.  The purpose of 
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arguing over Tian De’s existence is moot if there are no consequences to his actuality.  It is 
important to understand that if the extent of his deposition’s truthfulness is proven to be severely 
limited, then his deposition, and those that would come after, must be viewed under an entirely 
new lens. 
Afterlife and Impact 
Luo Ergang, a man who had served as Director of the Taiping Historical Museum, is one 
historian who argued in favor of the theory that a man by the name of Hong Daquan never 
existed.  As will be further discussed about other Chinese historians in the next chapter, this 
opinion may have been based in political bias as marked by his loyalty to the Communist Party.  
Without viewing this fact as inherently negative or positive, as Luo’s research was vital in 
establishing what modern scholars know about the Taiping today, it is important to note that his 
work was often praised by Mao Zedong, and was probably influenced by Luo’s distinctly Leftist 
lens.  Seeing as members of the Communist Party envisioned the Taiping movement as their 
predecessors in many ways, there was an advantage to spinning the Qing as a malicious entity, as 
well as in taking the movement’s lack of mention of a Tian De at face value.  
A chapter in James Hail’s Tseng Kwo-Fan and the Taiping Rebellion, an early study 
entitled “The Suppressed Leader” and published in 1927, proposed a version of Hong Daquan 
unlike the typical narrative provided by those in favor of his existence.  In it, Hail lists five 
insights that he believed provided proof not only for Hong’s existence, but for his position as a 
player of significant power in the early Taiping administrative structure.  These included the fact 
that the Qing took note of Hong in the first place, thinking it useful to capture him alive and 
transfer him to Beijing.  This, however, may not have been as deliberate as Hail believed.  There 
is just as much reason to believe that Hong claimed to be important once captured in hopes of 
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trading off this made up title for an improved chance at survival while in captivity.  Other 
elements, such as his claim to being from Hunan, were tested.  While that may have been true, a 
single aspect of one’s identity is not proof of any other facets of a person’s history.  The third 
and fourth points revolve around Hong’s title, something Hail claimed to clearly separate him 
from Hong Xiuquan, a fact which was apparently well known prior to the existence of the 
deposition.  Both of these arguments had been previously discredited by Thomas Meadows. 
The final point, and to Hail, “crowning proof of [the document’s authenticity]…lies in 
the remarkable understanding [Hong] has of the Tian Wang, who, to the followers of lower rank, 
must have appeared, through the glamour of imperial seclusion, a very able leader.”55  To Hail’s 
credit, after declaring Hong to be a legitimate player in the Taiping struggle and identifying him 
as a man named Zhu Jiudao, he outlines what this new reality might imply for understanding the 
Taiping, a point many scholars never reach in their analysis of the deposition of Tian De.  
Importantly, Hail also provides reasoning for the lack of mention of Hong Daquan in other 
Taiping documents and historical records, another aspect often neglected in research.  He 
attributed this to mass suppression efforts resulting from the shame in losing a leader; efforts also 
evident in the “deliberate editing” of one of Taiping leader Yang Xiuqing’s “speeches in order to 
omit reference to the presence of Triads among the following.”56  While this might be true, Hail 
never cited any proof of this, leaving it to mere speculation, should the reader accept his other 
premises on Hong Daquan as true.  The only time in which Hail did cite in this situation was to 
quote his opponents, like Thomas Meadows, who claimed that Hong’s existence was the result of 
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a clerical error, a stance taken after Meadows interviewed multiple members of the Taiping 
Heavenly Kingdom and searched for elements of editing and suppression in their documents.57  
While there exists precedent for a mass intentional coverup of information amongst dissenting 
forces, as shown by the Nian mentioned in this thesis’s introduction, precedent alone cannot 
justify Hail’s conjecture. 
It is necessary to keep in mind that Hail’s research, while at times in-depth and 
impressive, is not without bias or intention.  His language reveals that he wanted Hong’s 
confession to be real, positing that he might actually have descended from the line of Ming 
emperors.  He wrote as if driven to see Hong Xiuquan knocked from his rung as at the top of the 
Taiping political ladder.  Hail refers to Taiping religious belief as “iconoclastic, fanatical” and 
goes on to berate Hong Xiuquan as all too willing to “dwell in his well-filled harem and indulge 
his religious vagaries, while his generals won victories and ordered the government in his 
name.”58  It is interesting to note that this assertion of extreme military and political capability on 
behalf of Hong Daquan was part of what caused authors Callery and Yvan to doubt the 
document’s validity in the first place.59  Hail did not view this as an exaggeration aimed at taking 
down Hong Xiuquan.  Having taken the statement at face value, he seriously doubted anyone 
who claims the Tian Wang could have possibly been behind what he sees as the Taiping 
Heavenly Kingdom’s unlikely success and momentum.  In addition, he refers to the God-
Worshipping community as “pawns,” useful only in fulfilling the conquest dreams of both 
Hongs.  Hail’s commentary, while based in historical research, was likely influenced by his 
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environment.  Raised by two Presbyterian missionaries, and having himself earned a bachelor’s 
degree in Divinity at Yale, Hail’s traditional Christian leanings most likely predisposed him to be 
opposed to any sort of Taiping interpretation of his chosen religious beliefs.  In addition, his 
book was published in 1927, a year after his family’s expulsion from China by Chiang Kai-
shek’s Nationalist forces.  This new dynamic between Hail and the Chinese government, who 
through both Chiang and Sun Yat-sen viewed Hong Xiuquan and the Taiping as a first wave of a 
nationalist revolution, may have sparked a bitterness in his writing.60  It would be hard to 
imagine that these circumstances did not play some role in forming his opinions on change in 
China as such.61 
Whether or not a legitimate connection between Hail’s environment and his research can 
be drawn is uncertain.  This discussion does, however, remind the reader that every author 
possesses bias, and often has a purpose in setting out to write on a specific subject.  Hail’s 
analysis of Tian De often veers too much on the side of a larger ad hominin attack campaign 
aimed at Hong Xiuquan and forced together narratives too subjective to be considered useful in 
deciphering the identity of the man called Tian De.  His overall message, however, is useful.  
Hong Daquan might not have been the military and political mastermind Hail believed him to be, 
but to write him off as a mistake in the annals of history is to ignore the fact that Tian De has had 
an impact.  Tian De’s existence might be questionable, but the discussion around him is just as 
vital in interpreting the narrative that defined the outcome of, and continues to influence the 
conversation around, the Taiping Civil War. 
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Teng Ssu-yü, a history professor at Indiana University who worked closely John K. 
Fairbank, one of the period’s leading Sinologists, championed a third vision of Hong Daquan.  
Originally proposed by Jian Youwen in 1946, Teng conceded to people like Hail that the written 
confession of Tian De was not “entirely apocryphal, whereas the [Beijing] confession seems to 
have been scamped by some clerk during or after the examination.”62  Both Teng and Jian 
believed that a person named Hong Daquan did in fact exist, and most likely had served with the 
Taiping for some time before his capture.  They back this up by stating that unlike later Qing-
associated generals, whose extra-military positions required them to maintain broader focuses, 
those who captured Hong had little reason to lie to the imperial court about their progress.  
Forcing identities on prisoners was an unnecessary deed when the actual work being done was 
already satisfactory.  On the Beijing side of things, officials possessed the motivation that the 
army lacked.  Military campaigns were progressing as well as could be realistically expected.  
Victory might not have been secured yet, but the conflict was still very much in its infancy, and 
people like Saishanga had only positive notes to pass along to their superiors.  It was the emperor 
and his officials who had to worry about maintaining the loyalty of their literate subjects or keep 
the hungering nations of the West at bay. 
Later analysis from Teng found him backpedaling.  He was no longer willing to hear out 
the arguments of people like James Hail.  In Teng’s The Taiping Rebellion and the Western 
Powers, published in 1971, Hong Daquan is explicitly mentioned five times.  In each of these 
discussions Hong was directly associated with the leaders of the Heaven and Earth Societies, or 
Triads, that the leaders of the Taiping knowingly worked in conjunction with during the early 
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stages of their recruiting efforts.  Teng only connects Hong with the Taiping more closely when 
he discusses the inaccurate reports that plagued government-run and private publications 
throughout the conflict’s course.  He notes that “[r]iots by secret societies and despoliation by 
bandits had been confused with the activities of God-Worshippers in early accounts.  [Hong 
Xiuquan] was confused with a certain [Hong Daquan] who adopted the title of [Tian De Wang] 
(King of Celestial Virtue).”63  Teng went on to reject Hail’s identification of Hong as Triad 
leader Zhu Jiudao, instead affirming Jian Youwen’s belief that Hong was in reality a man known 
as Jiao Liang.  Jian’s vision of Jiao was much different from Hail’s discussion of Zhu.  Jiao was 
not a military mastermind, but a low-level official, one who had entered the Taiping ranks 
through the Triads.  It was Jian’s belief that Jiao had never received any official title from the 
Taiping.  His friendly relationship with Taiping authorities, due to his Triad experience, had 
accorded him the respect of being called “Master Hong,” but all this “ended abruptly in [Yongan 
zhou] and the so-called Hong Daquan was put in chains by the Taiping leaders.”64  Teng also 
looked to Guo Dingyi, another Chinese scholar of the first half of the twentieth century, when 
forwarding this identification.  Guo also believed that the man responsible for Tian De’s capture, 
the previously mentioned Saishanga, had “inserted some words into [Hong’s] confession in order 
to exaggerate his merit.”65  Teng was unsure of this statement’s validity.  According to the Qing 
shilu (清實錄), or the “Veritable records of the Qing dynasty,” the court had been rather satisfied 
with their force’s progress up until that point, giving Saishanga no reason to lie about his 
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prisoner’s identity.  In a turn of events, Saishanga had actually lost rank after he presented the 
court his new prisoner.66  All of this contributed to Teng’s belief that the man known as Hong 
Daquan was in reality a rather minor player in Taiping bureaucracy, and that his deposition had 
been put together by officials in Beijing, not by those in the field.  The belief that Hong Daquan 
was in reality Jiao Liang was also asserted by Chin Shunshin, an award-winning Taiwanese-
Japanese author, who claimed Jiao had been attempting to cause dissension amongst the Taiping 
ranks, although he cites no sources and is primarily known for his fiction.67  By asserting one 
name over another, Teng and Jian denied the legitimacy of all claims made by Hail on Hong 
Daquan’s suspected political authority over Hong Xiuquan’s religious claim to the Taiping 
throne. 
Discussion of Tian De as a prevalent actor during the early events of the Taiping Civil 
War dissipates amongst scholars in the 1970s.  Neither his name nor his confession is mentioned 
in any comprehensive detail, outside of the occasional inconsequential footnote or paragraph, in 
the more modern works of Jonathan Spence, Stephen Platt, and Tobie Meyer-Fong.  This lack of 
discussion on behalf of the field’s foremost scholars must be considered.  Platt’s mention barely 
touches upon the consequences of Tian De’s presence at all.  The single sentence devoted to the 
man is used exclusively to explain the lack of clear information available, and the lack of interest 
most foreigners had in the conflict during its first few years.68  One reason for this dearth of 
modern analysis might be the fact that, as pointed out by Teng Ssu-yü, the original confession 
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and its surrounding documents have yet to be uncovered, all prevalent information coming from 
published translations and the discussions surrounding these circulating versions.69  Those 
academic conversations that did occur were not as all-encompassing as they could have been.  
Teng may have continued the conversation on Hong’s existence, but he did not take Hail’s bait 
as to discussing his impact, leaving the subject entirely untouched.  As will be shown in the next 
chapter, analysis of Taiping depositions remains rooted in minutia, rather than engaged in larger 
cultural context and effect.  Historical study on Tian De is stuck in decoding who exactly this 
person was.  This is important for creating a framework for which to view the deposition because 
if, as this chapter argues, that Tian De was merely a blank canvas that officials in Beijing could 
project their own motives onto, a much different discussion is to be had than if Tian De was in 
fact a Taiping leader erased from history.  The conversation never passes this stage though.  The 
impact these publicly circulated documents may have had on defining the way onlookers viewed 
the struggle, formed their opinions on it, and decided how to act around it, is rarely considered in 
detail, if considered at all. 
 The deposition of Tian De set the stage for interpretations of the Taiping Heavenly 
Kingdom for years to come.  Hong Daquan’s words would echo in the ears of merchants, 
missionaries, and politicians throughout the Western world.  Through him the Qing dynasty was 
able to successfully put into question not only the chances of a Taiping victory, but also force 
Western powers to consider whether or not a Taiping-run China was something they actually 
desired.  Hong’s focus on his own pre-meditated entrance into the Taiping ranks and their 
divergent Christian practices caused apprehension amongst previously devoted Taiping 
supporters.  The questionable nature of the document’s origin, and arguments over its 
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truthfulness, meant that the process by which Western audience’s understood future depositions 
was similarly altered.  Depositions would be placed under much stricter scrutiny than they had 
been before.  In terms of impact on the Qing perspective, the amount of discussion the document 
brought into existence reinforced the belief that these documents did have power in the public 
realm.  As few foreigners had access to the Taiping themselves, any glance at their inner 
thoughts was jumped at and read eagerly by foreign audiences.  Tian De’s deposition may have 
made commentators more cautious in their analysis of depositions’ meanings, but it also proved 
that these same people had little ability to confirm what was fiction and what was truth.  Their 
ability to differentiate relied heavily on the words of few experts and left vastly different 
interpretations open to widespread acceptance.  The content of Tian De’s deposition, and 
discussions surrounding it must be viewed as biased and goal-oriented if secondary analysis is to 
properly evaluate the documents purpose and role. 
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Chapter 2: The Recanting of the Faithful King and the Movement’s Last Stand 
A Surprise Visit 
 Augustus F. Lindley could not believe his eyes.  The date was October 22, 1864, and for 
the first time since their parting interview in Wuxi, he was reading the words of an old friend.  
These, however, were not the words of the man he thought he knew.  The man’s name was Li 
Xiucheng, but he was more commonly referred to in China as the “Zhong Wang” of the Taiping 
Heavenly Kingdom, or the “Faithful King” for the English-speaking contemporaries paying 
attention to this fourteen-year conflict.70  A talented military commander and vital leader in the 
later days of the Taiping conquest, Li was in many ways viewed as the Kingdom’s last hope.  His 
capture outside of the town of Fangshan a mere three days after the fall of Nanjing marked an 
end to any serious attempt at victory on behalf of the Taiping.  He was one of the more well-
known Taiping generals amongst Europeans and is consequentially one of the more controversial 
figures of the war.  To those like Lindley he was “the most restless and determined of all the 
desperadoes Taeping-dom has sent forth.”71  As described by The Newcastle Courant, Li was 
“the only man whom the Taeping movement has produced on the rebel side who gave any proof 
of military talent, or any sign of having learnt the prudence of moderation in war.”72  To others, 
he was nothing more than a heathen working under the guise of Taiping sovereignty for his own 
gain.  This is why, on October 22, when the North China Herald, the primary news source for 
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English-speaking foreigners based in China, published a document known as “The Autographic 
Deposition of [Zhong] Wang, The Faithful King, at his Trial After the Capture of [Nanjing],” 
Lindley found himself angered and at a loss for words.  What had happened to the man Lindley 
hoped to claim as a hero back home?  This chapter will analyze the impact that Li’s confession 
had on the foreign community during its initial period of its circulation, as well as whether it had 
any continued influence as the memory of the Civil War waned.  After the completion of an 
original run of edits made by Zeng Guofan, the document acted as a piece of pro-Qing 
propaganda, reminding Westerners why they had broken their pledges of neutrality in the first 
place. 
 Li Xiucheng, as evidenced by his own words and by secondary research, joined up with 
the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom in 1851 during its march to Yongan.73  Born to a poor peasant 
family, Li worked his way from the bottom of the Taiping organization to the very top.  
Successful military campaigns in the Jiangnan region, including the capture of Hangzhou and 
Suzhou in 1860, and the defeat of a significant portion of Qing forces, poised Li to become the 
kingdom’s most essential military leader, a position he would hold until the end of the war.  Li’s 
outlook, compared to those of his fellow Taiping officials, was an interesting one.  His attitude 
toward foreigners made him popular in Western press outlets, and his relatively late arrival to the 
Taiping camp as a young boy meant that his views on Taiping religion, strategy, and goals did 
not align perfectly with the movement’s founders and their intentions.  This contrast would make 
Li an important figure in contemporaneous discussions attempting to uncover who the Taiping 
really were. 
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 In his deposition, the English translation of which spans around seventy-eight pages, the 
Faithful King confessed many things.74  The most startling was a sense of regret over the path his 
life had taken since first joining up with the Taiping back in Guangxi.  It highlighted an 
overwhelming mentality of helplessness toward how this enterprise had turned out.  In a sense, 
the now ironically titled “Faithful King” had recanted the ideology and state he had spent the 
past twelve years giving his life to and was about to lose it for.  “Now I have been taken 
prisoner; but how could I have known that it would come to this?  If I had foreseen the present 
disaster I could long ago have avoided it by remaining at home as an ordinary man.”75  In his 
book, Ti-ping Tien-kwoh, published two years after the Herald’s version of Li’s deposition 
surfaced, Lindley remained unconvinced that this supposed autobiographic statement contained 
any significant portion of truth.  The two-volume work was even dedicated to the Zhong Wong 
“if he be living; and if not, to his memory.” 
Lindley was without a doubt on the fringe when it came to views on Li Xiucheng’s fate 
after the fall of Nanjing.  The Times had published news of his capture as early as September 30; 
his eventual execution via “‘cutting into a thousand pieces’” being reported by September 17 and 
published on November 10.76  Even so, Lindley’s opinions had not arisen out of passion alone.  
There were others who seconded his doubts.  On November 18, twenty-seven days after the 
North China Herald published the first section of Li’s confession, The Age declared that “the fate 
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and whereabout of the [Zhong Wang]…is possibly the most salient point at present in Chinese 
politics.”77  The Age was no outsider periodical either; in fact it was the leading newspaper of the 
colony of Victoria at the time.  The paper cited contradictory government bulletins and apparent 
sightings by legible sources in Huzhou.  San Francisco-based paper The Daily Alta California 
would suffer from similar confusions.  On October 15, the same publication wrote of the Zhong 
Wang’s beheading, dating it to early September.  A paragraph later The Daily Alta California 
repeated that the Zhong Wang had been captured, but believed that he was still awaiting his 
sentence.78  On November 14, the paper wrote that its original report had been wrong, correctly 
affirming that the Zhong Wang had not been beheaded on August 2.79  However, the paper 
incorrectly believed that Li had been sent to Beijing, a place his trials never took him.80  It would 
not be until mid-January that The Age would confirm the Zhong Wang’s death.81  At the same 
time, the paper would comment on the repulsive characteristics which had apparently always 
characterized the movement, losing the undeniable tone of respect it had afforded the Zhong 
Wang in November.  What drove Lindley and the like-minded reporters at The Age to these 
doubts?  What evidence was there that the Zhong Wang’s confession was a result of the Qing 
dynasty’s supposed “addiction to forging documents of this sort?”82  As discussed in the previous 
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chapter, Li’s deposition was not the first popular confession to be published during the Taiping 
Civil War.  Time had not yet forgotten the Deposition of Tian De. 
Dubious Claims 
The Deposition of Tian De had shown the Qing to have a comprehensive understanding 
of the power of deposition as a political tool.  While the Qing’s attempt at delegitimizing and 
undermining the momentum of the Taiping was ultimately unsuccessful, this early attempt at 
redefining the Taiping narrative had a great impact on the nature of later depositions.  The case 
of Tian De gave Lindley reason to color his perception of the text.  He postulates that Li’s 
deposition might have been “made up by some prisoner of note…and the cunning writers 
attached to the Governor-General of the two” Jiang, Zeng Guofan.83  Lindley’s convictions, or 
perhaps they would be better characterized as hopes, may not have panned out, but his initial 
instincts were not entirely misplaced.  There was no reason to believe that Li Xiucheng’s 
deposition had not been edited before being published, the real question is to what extent, and 
why? 
Li Xiucheng’s writing covered a lot of ground.  A large portion of the text is dedicated to 
describing his pivotal role within the Taiping military and government.  His confession also 
alludes to internal conflict within the movement, musings on why it failed, and a few ardent 
pleas for kind treatment of his troops and their families.  The deposition was important not only 
for its content, but for the context it provided as well.  Seeing as it was published only three 
months removed from the events at Nanjing, Li’s words gave the European world its first major 
look at the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom since its initial collapse, from its earnest beginnings 
onward. 
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Lindley’s book acted as a response to the acknowledgment that Li Xiucheng’s deposition 
supposedly provided its readers with an uninterrupted and authentic view of Taiping history.  
Lindley was of the opinion that Li’s statements had largely been misrepresented and incorrectly 
interpreted by those involved in policy and the press.  His efforts to rework the mainstream 
understanding of the movement were supposedly commissioned by the Zhong Wang himself.84  
This added another layer to Lindley’s already dubious claims of authority on the subject.  Did 
this appeal for a new vision of the Taiping conflict have any notable impact on Western thought?  
As Hallett Abend notes in The God From The West, his 1947 book on Frederick Townsend 
Ward, “[Lindley’s] work was published after the fall of Nanking, after the death of the Heavenly 
King, and after the utter collapse of the Taiping movement, it could not have had a wide public 
appeal or a sizable sale.”  It is important to remember that by the time Ti-Ping Tien-Kwoh was 
available for public consumption in 1866, both Europe and Asia had become preoccupied with 
new conflicts.  One explanation Abend provided for Lindley’s push to publish is “the suspicion 
that the publication was heavily subsidized by Her Majesty’s Loyal Opposition in Parliament.”85  
While these suspicions were never confirmed, Lindley’s book is nonetheless populated with a 
series of heated attacks on both American and British actors involved on the Qing side of things.  
These partisan leanings must be taken into consideration when evaluating the legitimacy of 
Lindley’s claims. 
A Critique’s Origin 
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Another element of Lindley’s criticism to consider is the nature of his publisher.  The 
firm that championed his work was known as Day & Son.  Day & Son, who had once been 
awarded a Royal Warrant, had run into both financial and legal trouble after attempting to assist 
exiled Hungarian patriot Lajos Kossuth print a new currency.86  This was clearly intended to 
“promote revolution and discord” to many observers following Kossuth’s case.87  Vincent 
Brooks, another publisher who had purchased the Day & Son firm, had similarly courted 
controversy after he served as one of prominent utopian socialist philosopher Robert Owen’s 
primary publishers.88  If these publishers had any outright connections to the Taiping movement, 
they were not obvious.  In addition, the ideals Kossuth and Owen held clearly differed from the 
utopian ideas formulating in China.89  Nonetheless, the predisposition they demonstrated toward 
independence-minded movements indicates a willingness to support alternative world visions 
and opposition movements.  It is without question that Lindley stood opposed to “the evil foreign 
policy which Great Britain, during the last few years, has pursued.”90  These ideological leanings 
only further encourage suspicions that Lindley’s writing may have had more directly political 
undertones than meet the eye.  Regardless of political allegiances and ideological goals, thanks to 
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Charles Curwen’s 1977 book, Taiping Rebel, Lindley’s concerns have been somewhat 
confirmed.  The book places both the original and edited versions side by side for easy 
comparison, allowing readers to gain an understanding of exactly where, and perhaps why, Zeng 
chose to alter Li Xiucheng’s words as he did.  Curwen’s knowledge of Zeng’s edits came from a 
few sources, one being the clear red marks found on the original manuscript, another being the 
diary entries of Zhao Liewen, a member of Zeng’s mufu (幕府), or inner administration.91  Zhao’s 
journal, which was rather unembellished according to a 1972 study of Zeng Guofan’s 
administration by Jonathan Porter, explicitly mentioned an editing process.  In it Zhao also 
records that he was asked to read through the document twice, indicating that he may have 
played the role of a mysterious second editor Curwen could not identify.92 
If one were to look purely at the number of articles Western periodicals ran on Li 
Xiucheng’s confession, one might get the impression that this document, quite frankly, was not 
significant at all.  As previously argued, Lindley’s timing was off.  Most newspapers had moved 
on rather quickly and were no longer invested in the now silent battlefront.  Even the North 
China Herald neglected to mention it much after publishing the last section of its appendix to the 
document in March of 1865.  So why was Lindley so obsessed with redirecting the narrative 
most observers derived from Li’s words?  Just as Lindley maintained hope that the Zhong Wang 
still lived, he had equal faith in the eventual success of the Taiping movement.  Rumors of 
surviving Taiping forces still circulated.  One purported that a Taiping army had recently begun 
to conquer territory in Fujian, an army Lindley incorrectly believed was led by the departed 
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Hong Rengan, cousin to the Heavenly throne and an active reformer in the movement’s latter 
days.93  If this was true then there was immediate cause for renegotiating the terms by which the 
Western world discussed and looked back upon the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom’s attempt at 
conquest as originally cemented by Li’s confession.  “[F]or the Heavenly Father is with us, and 
who can triumph against him?”94  By using this quote from the general Taiping leadership 
Lindley asserted the Christian faith that had been stripped from them since Li’s confession.  He 
told the members of the European world that they may have been wrong in their initial 
judgement.  Lindley was not the only person who felt that this confession held an important 
position.  One man who felt similarly was the previously mentioned Zeng Guofan, Commander-
in-Chief of the Hunan Army and the Qing official responsible for coordinating the successful 
Qing siege of Nanjing. 
The Official Perspective 
Zeng Guofan had not built his Hunan Army from the columns of Banner troops already 
in the service of the Qing dynasty, but from the myriad of local subjects under his jurisdiction 
directly affected by the Taiping encroachment toward Central China.  The organization’s unique 
beginning offers up some light on Zeng’s position and goals within the empire.  Regardless of 
personal belief, Zeng expressed no royal ambitions or dreams.  He portrayed himself as a model 
statesman, one who loyally served his emperor and dynasty.  That is not to say he did not see 
problems with the way the bureaucracy had been managed in recent years, as was evident by his 
initiative in starting the Hunan Army.  This action clearly indicated a lack of confidence in 
imperial ability to resist the Taiping advance and protect Qing civilians and their property.  
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Zeng’s uncertainty was directed right back at him from the imperial court.  The officials in 
Beijing might have needed Zeng’s organizational prowess, but they used him cautiously, 
suspicious of his motives.  As Jonathan Porter points out, by the end of the war “[Zeng’s] 
autonomy had already progressed so far that his organization could be regarded as a viable 
foundation for a new Chinese dynasty, controlling the richest area of the empire and wielding 
authority in all of the crucial areas of personnel, finance, and military power.”95  This mutual 
distrust, put aside in the name of the same goal, underlies the unique vision Zeng hoped to 
portray in releasing Li’s confession.  The resulting document showcases a much more complex 
effort than a simple attempt at painting the Taiping as an overwhelming evil. 
Upon the Zhong Wang’s capture, Zeng wrote in a memorial to the imperial palace that 
there existed “a great number of people who read rebel depositions.”96  This statement proved 
true, at least during the conflict’s immediate aftermath.  The North China Herald ran the Zhong 
Wang’s deposition and related materials for over four months following the translated 
document’s initial publishing.  Li Xiucheng’s words dominated the space within the weekly 
edition’s few pages, and the paper’s columns offered up relevant perspectives sanctioned by 
British Parliament on more than a few occasions.  From their defeat in the first Opium War to the 
subsequent signing of a myriad of unequal treaties, the Taiping Civil War found the Qing 
government in the midst of its so-called “Century of Humiliation.”  Li’s confession came at a 
time when Qing China’s success as a unified entity relied heavily on its ability to disarm and 
fend off outside forces.  Maintaining the state’s image as crucial to stability as it had always 
been.  Zeng might have had his problems with the Qing, but his fear of more Western intrusions 
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greatly outweighed any thoughts of disloyalty.  Zeng felt that increased involvement from the 
West would only place the Qing in a double bind.  Any victories achieved with foreign 
assistance would only wrestle control away from the state.  Any losses would damage the state’s 
reputation and risk bringing on more political and financial burdens.97  In addition to 
condemning the Taiping movement’s motivations and actions, Zeng’s edits transformed Li’s 
confession into an affirmation of Qing authority.  It was no doubt that public opinion in the West 
on the Taiping had certainly soured during the last few years of the kingdom’s rule.  Public 
opinion on the Qing, however, had not necessarily improved in its place.  As the conflict neared 
its end European nations began to feel the strain of the Taiping Civil War on their investments, 
and involvement, in the region.  In many ways the confession served as a reminder that it made 
more sense for European powers to continue to support the Qing than it did for them to take any 
stronger action against the Qing than they already had. 
“The thing to be feared now is that the foreign devils will certainly take action.”98  
Whether intentional or not, this was Li’s last message to his captors.  It was a warning to his 
fellow countrymen of the dangers that lay ahead.  These cautionary words, alongside a list of 
“ten propositions anent securing allegiance of the rebels…as a ransom of his life, and his words 
announcing ten fatal causes which lead to the defeat and death of the rebel [Hong],” are removed 
from the confession as it appeared in the North China Herald.99  The section is not even 
mentioned, whereas his ten errors and requests are explicitly stated as having been removed from 
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the transcript.  Two questions arise from this juxtaposition.  Why mention the propositions at all 
if they were not going to published?  More importantly, what purpose does the deliberate 
removal of anti-foreign sentiment have?  To answer the first question, one can look back at the 
previous paragraph’s analysis of state image.  It is only in hindsight that one can view Li’s 
capture as an official end for the Taiping.  Hong Tiangui Fu, heir apparent to the heavenly throne 
of the Taiping, was still at large; as was Hong Rengan, the heir’s uncle and perhaps the last true 
believer in the movement’s cause.  By stating that a set of terms existed, without disclosing their 
actual content, Zeng relayed a sense of control over the matter.  Zeng did this in his reports to the 
imperial court as well.  According to Stephen Platt, Zeng’s embellished report after Nanjing’s 
fall made it seem that “a hundred thousand rebel soldiers had been killed in the fighting, inflating 
the glory of his family and his army, masking their looting and atrocities against civilians.”100  
The inclusion reminded the world that it was not the European led Ever-Victorious Army that 
had reclaimed Nanjing, but the Hunan Army.  Zeng Guofan, and through him the entire Qing 
dynasty, had seen to the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom’s initial collapse and would be capable of 
finishing it without extraneous hands. 
Zeng Guofan’s purpose behind deliberately removing any warnings about foreign powers 
is less ascertainable.  Doing so could have been for a few reasons, one of which being that Zeng 
did not wish to provoke the West in any way.  Whereas including mentions of Li Xiucheng’s 
terms of surrender built up the image of the Qing, theoretical guidance on how to deal with 
foreigners risked bringing it back down, should Westerners believe that Zeng aimed to follow it.  
On a more pragmatic level, the removal might indicate that Zeng did in fact desire to take note of 
Li’s words, hoping to obtain the upper hand by hiding this information from sight.  This 
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discussion further signifies the fact that Zeng had not intended to paint the Taiping as an evil 
enemy overall.  Zeng’s edits portray Li and the Taiping as an enemy worth fighting, but not for 
uniform reasons.  The demons he constructed were not entirely black and white. 
The fact that his capture essentially ended the civil war could not have been known to Li 
upon his capture.  As Li put his life to words he hoped to not only achieve some sort of amnesty 
for his own actions but also to spare the lives of his family and fellow Taiping followers.  As will 
be seen later in this chapter, this difference in expectations produced a much more malleable 
document, one already pre-disposed in favor of imperial forces.  Zeng’s edits did not re-arrange 
the entire document.  These changes primarily focused on fixing grammatical errors, removing 
unnecessary information, and statements so flattering toward Zeng and his troops that they might 
inflame the court’s already heightened suspicions.101  Those few edits not related to document’s 
overall appearance do however aim to reinforce any malleability Li left open. 
Securing the Western Front 
A weekly column from the North China Herald, titled “Impartial Not Neutral” espoused 
a view much more in line with Zeng’s edits than Lindley’s evaluations.  Appearing in issue 
number 744, one week after the confession’s first appearance, the column states as follows: “He, 
the Faithful King, one of the pillars of the faith so called, repudiates or ignores the existence of 
that great moral inspiration which had been represented by the friends of the insurgents as the 
moving spring of all the acts performed under the rebel administration.”  The column ended on a 
steadfast note, proclaiming that “we are justified in coming to the conclusion no high and noble 
aspirations filled the breasts of the men who initiated the rebellion – that, in a word, they were 
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ambitious schemers plotting to overthrow a government for the sake of their own personal 
aggrandisement, and utterly unfit to organise a system, or in any degree secure the happiness of 
the people.”102  Here, Lindley’s sentiment of shock and disbelief was replaced with a feeling of 
smug satisfaction, and an undoubting belief that what was written down was the truth.  The 
editorial unabashedly declared that it was “unlikely that any exaggeration or misrepresentation 
had crept into [Li’s] report.” 103  This moment serves as the most direct affirmation of Zeng’s 
conviction.  Arguably China’s most influential foreign paper, circulating almost eight thousand 
copies in its prime, had found in Li Xiucheng’s deposition a defining piece of evidence in 
confirming the righteousness of Great Britain’s political stance over the past fourteen years. 
This view of the Heavenly dynasty would hold sway over mainstream Western viewers 
for years to come.  An article by G. T. Ferris, published by The Cosmopolitan in 1889, held to 
earlier convictions of the Zhong Wang’s bravery, but went no further in praising him.  The 
article painted him in the same light that the paper had used when they spoke of the rest of the 
movement’s leaders.  The Zhong Wang was no longer a man of mercy, but a violent rebel leader 
who “burned and slaughtered to the very suburbs of Shanghai” and allowed for “rape, robbery, 
murder, and every form of savage brutality” to dominate the territories he took.104  It is here that 
the Zhong Wang’s attempt to find a middle ground, and placate his captors, might have done his 
cause more harm than good.  By declaring himself a believer of the inevitable, he alienated many 
of the Western missionaries and commentators who might have maintained their loyalty to the 
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Taiping otherwise.  People like Archdeacon Arthur Moule would comment that the Taiping 
movement might have begun under a Christian ideal, but this was only an ideal, and one that had 
been lost along the way.  As early as 1861, Moule had lost hope in possibility of a Christian 
success through the Taiping.105  In a lecture read before the Shanghai Literary and Debating 
Society, he noted that the job of the Christian missionary was much harder in 1883 than it was 
prior to the Civil War.  The Christian proclamations of the Taiping only linked the belief system 
with violence and unrest; bringing about a much warier population and government than had 
existed before.106  Moule and his contemporaries no longer saw supporting a group, whose 
commitment to God was now in question and circumstantial at best, as having been worth the 
image setback.  The Washington Post made a similar comment in 1900.  The paper referred to 
Taiping religious belief as “Christianity” and therefore attributed a lack of sincerity or legitimacy 
to it.  The author continued on to associate this period of violence with contemporary opinions 
on Christianity’s influx in China, claiming that Chinese spectators see Christianity’s continued 
infiltration as “a carnival of blood.”107 
“After I worshipped God I never dared to transgress in the slightest, but was a sincere 
believer, always fearing harm from serpents and tigers.”108  This sentence is conspicuously 
absent from the first section of Li’s deposition published in the North China Herald.  Edited out 
by Zeng, this missing sentiment reframes the rest of Li’s confession.  In place of any notion of 
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sincere belief, readers of the North China Herald heard of a population coerced into believing in 
God.  “The people of the world are all afraid of death; being told that serpents and tigers would 
devour them, who would not be afraid.  Therefore they obeyed.”109  These two statements are 
quite similar in content, but promote much different perspectives on the Taiping movement’s 
Christian motives.  The first statement is a simple one.  Li declared himself to be a true believer 
in the message of God.  The fear of serpents and tigers may not be a conventional one for the 
average Western Christian, but the fear of punishment for one’s sins, such as the act of non-
belief, is standard fare.  This is a concept that can be easily translated into a European context, 
and can be justified as not a new interpretation, but an adaption of biblical penances for a 
Chinese stage.  The second statement is much less easily rationalized as a profession of true 
belief in a Western context.  This becomes even more evident when Li attributes that majority of 
Taiping conversions to a desire for a secure source of food.  The concept of “Rice Christians” 
was nothing new, having been tossed around since the Jesuits’ early expeditions into Chinese 
territories.  What separates these two is that most “Rice Christians” were organized into small, 
localized communities, not large political institutions that aimed to establish a new Heavenly 
regime.  The Zhong Wang’s declaration of personal faith may not have been much, but it 
provided some basis for the movement’s Christian leanings.  Instead the North China Herald 
finds “[n]o enthusiasm for the spread of truth and Christianity” in the contents of Li’s confession. 
110  The removal of any mention of sincere belief only more heavily emphasizes the notion that 
the Taiping was in reality made of very few “true” Christians.  It was an important step in 
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solidifying anti-Taiping attitudes amongst Europeans.  It was much easier to justify siding with 
the Qing against a reportedly Christian movement when those people were Christian in name 
alone. 
It is in this manner that Zeng Guofan managed to transform Li’s confession into a pro-
Qing piece of propaganda.  Through small cuts and edits, Zeng made Li’s position much more 
ambiguous.  By doing this, Zeng does not necessarily aim to improve the reader’s perception of 
the Qing as a moral entity; he merely makes that of the Taiping more questionable.  Doing 
anything else would have been both incredibly difficult and out of character for someone in 
Zeng’s position.  Zeng had his own conflicts with the Qing, who in turn had problems with the 
West, and so on.  From the Ever-Victorious Army’s disagreements with Qing forces over 
execution procedures to Zeng’s inability to control his army’s desire to loot and raze captured 
Taiping territory, including the occasional slaughter of said territory’s inhabitants, it was clear 
that the nations of the West alliance with China’s elite would be an uneasy one.111 
Coming Around 
Anti-Taiping sentiment had not always been the standard to which Western nations held.  
According to Holgor Cahill’s 1930 biography of Frederick Townsend Ward, commander of the 
Ever-Victorious Army, this sentiment would not gain widespread traction until the signing of the 
Treaty of Beijing, a treaty foisted upon the Qing in 1860 which ceded landed and power to the 
United Kingdom, France, and Russia.  It was at this time that nations like Great Britain and 
France decided there was more political and economic gain to be had by siding with the Qing.  
Cahill continued to describe the myriad of claims made against the Taiping from this time 
forward, from tales of Hong Xiuquan’s hundred wives, to the kingdom’s supposed razing of 
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Suzhou, in which it was claimed that thousands of innocents had been killed.  He even mentions 
the Zhong Wang, seconding the previously mentioned claims made by The Times and Newcastle 
Courant, emphasizing that his merciful behavior towards his opponents was well-known around 
the world.112  What does this lasting impression of Li say about Zeng’s decision to go public with 
his deposition?  This decision was ultimately a successful one.  If Zeng’s goal was to use Li as a 
tool, securing the prevailing narrative of the Taiping as a threat to the Western world, and 
tangentially demonizing him in the process, it undoubtedly worked.  This vision may have 
existed amongst Western viewers prior to the confession’s publishing, but its existence secured 
and hardened these beliefs.  It gave the nations of West the authentic voice it needed to declare 
themselves to be participants in a just war, fighting to protect China from the exploits of a false 
prophet. 
If it was well-known that a majority of the reading public in Europe had sided with the 
Qing, or at the very least come around against the Taiping, who was Zeng Guofan targeting 
when he decided to go public with this confession?  One demographic he might have had in 
mind is the group of missionaries who still believed in the movement’s Christian vision.  One 
member of this faction was Reverend J. V. Worthington, who in April of 1864, published a series 
of commentaries by fellow Lutheran missionary Wilhelm Lobscheid.  For Worthington, who also 
wrote the introduction to The Taeping as They Were, these commentaries illustrated “the noble 
and dignified costume” worn by the Taiping.  “They look like the Lords of China.”  He went on 
to shame the British government for its conduct; unable to understand his nation’s ignorance of 
what he viewed as an inherently progressive, Christian agenda.  It is important to keep in mind 
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that the Taiping Civil War was, in the minds of many, Christianity’s only real chance at securing 
a permanent foothold in China.  Any particularities in theology or practice could be wrinkled out 
with a little bit of guidance from the Heavenly Kingdom’s Protestant big brother.  Lobscheid is 
of the opinion that the proselytizers who had turned their backs on the Taiping did so out of a 
lack of credit for what they saw as their own doing. 
Isaachar Roberts was one of these people.  Roberts, being the only foreigner to have had 
extensive interactions with Hong Xiuquan, projected a certain aura of authority over the issue of 
the movement’s Christianity, especially in their earliest days.  Roberts may have had the 
experience to back his claims of authority, but this time with Hong and his early followers was 
exactly what led to more conventional contemporaries of Roberts to mock him relentlessly.  An 
1861 article in The Daily Alta California provided readers with some choice words from 
Roberts.  The quote, given halfway through his stay in Nanjing, declared the Zhong Wang to be a 
good Christian, although the paper noted the group’s lack of orthodoxy.113  Roberts would leave 
Nanjing soon after this, decrying the Taiping leaders as unfit to rule, just as the North China 
Herald would two years later.114  Wilhelm Lobscheid is frustrated by actions like these, actions 
he sees taken again and again by missionaries throughout China.  To him these denouncements 
were derived from explicitly selfish and political motives.  They were the voices of missionaries 
who turned around when the job became too difficult, or when they were not immediately 
heralded as the saviors they believed themselves to be.  “[I]f they are missionaries, it is their duty 
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to try and remedy the faults they do nothing but rail at,” instead of actively advocating against 
their success and development. 
It is clear at this point that a resistance, however small, to the demonization of the 
Taiping Heavenly Kingdom had found a voice and was in a position to use it.  This opposition 
may have been made up of a few missionaries, soldiers of fortune, and adventurers here and 
there, but its members possessed a quality most of mainstream commentators lacked: they had 
lived with the Taiping.  While plenty of Europeans had visited the Heavenly Kingdom, or been 
treated to brief stays, few people had spent large spans of time with them, especially after the 
turn of the decade.  It is questionable whether Zeng had hoped to change the minds of these 
people, and these oppositional, although solid, never seemed to catch on.  A more likely 
assumption is that by publishing Li Xiucheng’s deposition, Zeng hoped to pose these voices as 
even more partisan and biased than they had already appeared to be.  What could be more 
authentic and accurate than the voice of the Taiping themselves?  Zeng’s edits established these 
voices as mere visitors, who could not have had access to thoughts and motives that only Li 
could see within himself. 
The Movement’s Last Stand 
 The deposition of Hong Rengan may have been the last Taiping confession of note to be 
published to a wide audience.  Shorter than Li Xiucheng’s confession, and significantly more 
informative than Hong Tiangui Fu’s, the deposition serves as an interesting contrast to those that 
came before it.  Excerpts of the translated document appeared in the North China Herald a total 
of four times before it was available to foreign eyes in its entirety.  According to Franz Michael 
this is the only instance in which the entire document has been made available to the public.  The 
official confession of Hong Rengan, Shield King of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, major 
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reformer and ambassador to the West, was only to be read in full in English.115  When facing 
their own people, members of the imperial court had no more story to tell.  The Qing and those 
living within the empire had lived through the conflict once already, there was no reason to live 
through this period of radicalism once more, even if only through the words of a dead man. 
 Hong Rengan was forty-three at the time of his execution.116  Up until then he had 
devoted an entire third of his life to furthering the cause of the Taiping and supporting his old 
cousin, and sovereign, Hong Xiuquan.  Like his cousin, Hong had failed to pass the state 
examinations.  He had earnt his living tutoring young students in his village, passing on 
Confucian traditions and knowledge, just as many other failed examinee candidates chose to do.  
Hong could have easily lived out the rest of his days quietly doing so, and he may have if Hong 
Xiuquan had not concluded in 1843 that his visions had been a religious call to action. Upon 
hearing this Hong, alongside the family’s neighbor, Feng Yunshan, answered his cousin’s call 
and became one of Hong Xiuquan’s first converts.117  Despite his family’s efforts at keeping him 
at home and in the classroom, they could not stop Hong Rengan from becoming one of the 
Heavenly Kingdom’s most devoted followers. 
It was by chance alone that Hong’s path deviated from the rest of the Taiping camp from 
there on out.  After visiting Swedish missionary and early Taiping advocate, Theodore Hamburg, 
in the middle of 1852, Hong would become separated from the movement for almost a decade, as 
his attempts to travel inward from the cities of Hong Kong and Shanghai were continually foiled 
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by Qing troops and other mishaps.  This separation became a vital tool and defining aspect of 
Hong’s role within the movement.  It was in Hong Kong that he met James Legge, a Scottish 
missionary who Hong would work closely with in the coming years, despite Legge’s firm 
conviction that Taiping Christian doctrine was not yet legitimate.  While studying and preaching 
under Legge’s tutelage, Hong would become much more informed than his brethren in Nanjing 
on the affairs of the world outside of China.  While there he would establish himself among 
foreign actors as “the proselytizer, fearlessly exposing [Taiping] errors, and extorting them to 
repent and believe the Gospel” as reported by in the Overland Register on August 25, 1860.118  
In addition, as expressed in Missionary Magazine, the Western world would come to respect his 
literary attainments and attitude, impressed by his versatility and sincerity.119  This background 
became invaluable to Hong when he finally rejoined the rest of the movement in 1859 as an 
ambassador and reformer.  Jian Youwen echoes the bold sentiment that Hong Xiuquan felt upon 
greeting his long-separated cousin, “there was no one better qualified to assume the multifaceted 
religious, political, cultural, and military responsibilities of chief administrator in the Heavenly 
dynasty.”120 
 Hong Rengan’s deposition differs from the previous two showcased in this thesis in some 
striking ways.  Edits to the document are essentially non-existent and show up exclusively in the 
Chinese version of the text published by the governor of Jiangsi, Shen Baozhen.  The few edits 
that were made show up as the removal of some poetry here and there and the toning down of 
some negative comments directed towards Zeng Guofan and his brothers.  Commentary by 
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contemporary viewers is oddly few and far between.  Analysis by scholars in secondary sources 
is just as hard to come by.  What is it about Hong’s deposition that made it so much less 
prevalent to those with some stake left in this now defunct conflict?  Hong’s hardline attitude 
toward the Qing and the West and continued religious fervor left little room for interpretation.  
His analytical approach to the movement’s fall could in no capacity further support the West’s 
decision to help silence its Christian kin. 
 First, to analyze the deposition itself, Hong Rengan posed himself as a simple man, one 
who desired nothing more than to “rely on his gracious protection in order to enable me to live 
out my normal span of life,” albeit one who was quite well educated and never lacked any 
opinions.121  Unlike the Zhong Wang, however, Hong does not attempt to justify his actions as a 
result of circumstance, instead proudly claiming ownership of his actions and declaring his intent 
to “resign all into the keeping of Heaven,” even if that should bring about his death.122  He 
continued on to describe in detail the movement’s religious beginnings, making his devotion to 
the Tian Wang’s form of Christianity clear, and his attempt to gain military experience upon his 
entrance back into the Taiping fold.  The end of this section, which also contains the last bit of 
available Chinese text available to the public, showcased a Shield King in conflict with the more 
experienced generals surrounding him.  It is a manifestation of his earlier concerns on potential 
jealous; even the Zhong Wang, who had once been the only commander Hong could count on to 
agree with him, had chosen to ignore his “lofty views” and express his loss of hope at success, 
and the Shield King’s refusal to see this only caused Li great pain.123  It is from this section 
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forward that Hong shifts his focus from a history of the movement to his understanding of the 
Heavenly dynasty’s demise. 
 “We come now to the cause of all our troubles – the assistance rendered by foreigners to 
the Imps.”124  It is with these bold words that Hong Rengan declared his unflinching dedication 
to the Taiping ideology and goals.  Where Li Xiucheng ended his unedited deposition with an 
anguished cry, despairing at the fate of the kingdom’s people and falling back on his lack of 
ability and understanding, Hong maintained a sense of calm.  Rather than break down or attempt 
to escape his sure to be fatal future, he persisted as if nothing has changed, addressing the end of 
the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom factually and remotely.  Quotes like the one above explain why 
the Qing may not have bothered at an attempt to adjust the narrative it lays out.  Hong refused to 
adjust even his language in the presence of his captors, referring to his opponents as “Imps” until 
his execution.  Unlike the character of Tian De or the concerned general, Li Xiucheng, Hong 
gave the Qing no room to adjust.  His proclamation and retelling of his faith, alongside his 
understanding of his kingdom’s drawbacks and how these led to its demise are not easily 
spinnable as anything but what they claim to be.  This may explain why the only edit Shen 
Baozhen made was to remove some of the more damaging insults to his compatriots, the Zeng 
family.  He could not hope to get any use out of the deposition, only aim to control any internal 
harm it might create. 
 Analysis of the deposition itself can only theorize why discussion of it never 
materialized.  A search of prominent Western newspapers, including The Times, to The Age, The 
San Francisco Chronicle, and The New York Times, amongst others, showed that the Shield King 
received almost no mention in press based outside of China after news of his capture was 
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received.125  Similarly, the document receives little notice in secondary research on the topic.  
Franz Michael refers only to primary sources in his discussion of the confession.  Even Stephen 
Platt’s Autumn in the Heavenly Kingdom, a book whose contents largely revolve around Hong’s 
involvement in the Taiping movement, ends its narrative upon Hong’s capture, using his 
deposition as a source without ever considering the context surrounding it.  What could possibly 
explain the lack of interest in the autobiographical statement of perhaps the most well-liked 
bureaucrat and ambassador of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom?  As mentioned earlier, the fact 
that “Hong did not expect to be pardoned” and his refusal to “indulge in personalities as [Li 
Xiucheng] did” added up to a document that simply was not as interpretable.126  Hong 
maintained the demeanor he had originally gained respect for until the end, making his departing 
words incredibly difficult to exploit for any specific end goal.  The deposition spoke for itself, 
and the world would let it do so. 
Afterlife and Impact 
Zeng Guofan had no way of knowing that his edits to Li Xiucheng’s confession would 
maintain their noteworthy status for the next century to come.  Shen Baozhen could not have 
known that Hong Rengan’s deposition would not.  Many of the original leaders of China’s 
communist movement saw themselves as successors to the advances the Taiping had made.  For 
much of the Chinese Communist Party’s origins Taiping actions were used to shape the party’s 
own images and notions of Chinese nationalism and history.  Zeng’s removal of lines like “I did 
this because of my unquestioning loyalty, in order to save the Sovereign who was in danger” 
                                                          
125 The last instance in which The Times referenced Hong Rengan, in the context of the 
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allow for such discussion to happen in the first place.127  They make Li’s actions seem just as 
dubious to commentators of the twentieth century as they did to Augustus Lindley.  It is due to 
this that much debate surrounded the status of Li as either a hero or a traitor.  As discussed by 
Steven Uhalley Jr. in 1966, around the time of the conflict’s centenary, much of the evidence 
used to prove Li’s status came directly from his confession.  Uhalley provides an example of 
these debates by comparing two varying opinions.  One of these opinions was provided by Luo 
Ergang.  Uhalley considered Luo to be “the leading authority on the Taipings in Mainland China 
today” as did many other Western scholars of the period, evident by frequent citing of his 
work.128  The contrasting opinion was provided by a prominent Party endorsed historian by the 
name of Qi Benyu.  Qi was both a powerful politician, close to Mao until the Cultural 
Revolution, and a dominant figure in Chinese scholarship at the time.  He headed the history 
department of the Red Flag, a political journal started in 1958, and served as the primary outlet 
of CCP theory during the Cultural Revolution.129 
According to Luo Ergang, Li Xiucheng maintained his genuine status as “Loyal King” 
until his execution.  “[W]hat many historians have accepted as treachery by Li had actually been 
an extremely clever strategem [sic]…intended to deceive Li's captor, [Zeng Guofan], with the 
aim of buying time for the Taipings.”130  Uhally admits that Luo’s description of a “self-sacrifice 
plan” is in reality unlikely.  He calls back to an argument made by Jian Youwen, who similarly 
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asserts that Luo’s conclusion is unlikely.131  Qi Benyu’s argument disregards this possibility 
entirely.  Qi’s main argument maintains that the job of the historian is to analyze actions not 
speculative motives.  He states that purposefully or not, Li’s confession sets him up as having 
betrayed the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom.  The fact that this argument involves distinguished 
political and academic actors is proof of the perceived importance of Li’s actions to defining 
Chinese communist identity.  If the Chinese Communist Party claimed Li as a hero when in 
reality he had been a traitor, or vice a versa, Chinese communist thought would lose a vital part 
of its cultural lineage.  Hong Rengan’s deposition emphasized quite the contrary.  There was no 
need to argue over his dedication to the Taiping cause and therefore debate over his place as a 
legitimate ancestral hero. 
Another example of the lasting impact of Li Xiucheng’s confession is to be found in the 
way books published for public consumption refer to him.  Take for instance The Taiping 
Revolution, first translated by the Foreign Language Press in 1976, a book written by members 
of the Fudan University and Shanghai Normal University faculty.  The authors, known 
collectively as the Compilation Group for the “History of Modern China” Series, portray Li’s 
later actions as demoralizing, abasing, recalcitrant.  They continue to describe elements of his 
confession as exaggerated, inaccurate, and boastful.  Furthermore, when mentioning his escape 
from Nanjing with Hong’s recently crowned heir no mention is made of his attempt to save the 
young sovereign by giving away his horse.  Instead the book informs the reader of Li’s flight to 
Fangshan as being dominated by his attempt to secure the kingdom’s “gold, silver, pearls and 
precious stones” and resulting in “meekly expressed repentance” so that his life might be 
                                                          
131 Jian Youwen played a unique role in Taiping historiography due to his position as a 
member of the Nationalist Party and as a devout Christian. 
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spared.132  It is interesting to see the book quote from Augustus Lindley as well.  Quoting from 
his history four times over the course of the book’s one hundred and seventy-four pages the 
authors find a powerful ally in Lindley’s unswaying belief in the movement’s positive nature.  
They even start the book off with a painting of Lindley’s exploits and efforts to assist the Taiping 
in combat towards the conflict’s end. 
The Taiping Revolution may not have been written by any prominent political leaders, but 
the company responsible for its circulation has been closely associated with the Chinese 
government ever since the organization’s founding in 1952.  The Foreign Language Press 
primarily targets the international community, just as Zeng Guofan aimed to do when he 
published Li Xiucheng’s deposition in the North China Herald.  What this coverage, and the 
previous discussion analyzed by Stephen Uhally Jr., fail to do is consider the historicity of the 
issue.  Uhally faults Qi Benyu and his associates for viewing Li’s words through a strictly 
Marxist lens.  There is some legitimacy to this.  A considerable portion of the discussions around 
Li’s confession tend to begin with judgement already in place.  Rather than view Li’s words and 
their effect in their own historical context many instances of scholarship jump straight to 
mapping modern conceptions of “hero” or “villain” onto Li based on their own biases.  Uhally 
himself is no better than those he is accusing.  By deferring to Jian Youwen’s interpretation and 
belittling the work of Mainland Chinese scholars he shows himself to be another tool in the 
political game that is justifying Nationalist or Communist rule. 
Despite its seemingly peripheral place in Taiping history at the time, a belief encouraged 
by the lack of major discussion on the topic in Western publications, the deposition of Li 
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Xiucheng has persisted, maintaining its relevance for over a century.  The document is important 
not only for the light it provides on Taiping inner-politics but for the clear manner in which Zeng 
Guofan’s editing history can be seen through it.  Thanks to Charles Curwen’s translation and 
formatting efforts, modern scholars can see how the deposition of Li Xiucheng showcased the 
political struggles the Qing dynasty continued to face, even as the violence brought on by the 
war faded away.  From the state of stability desired by Zeng and his fellow literati, to the 
attempts at staving off Western pressures and involvement sought by the imperial court, Li’s 
subtly transformed words provided a clear platform from which all parties could promote their 
own narratives.  On the other hand, Hong Rengan’s deposition has remained in the shadows.  Its 
pages have provided significant insight on the origins of the movement and Taiping religious 
practice as a whole, but its more direct stance and unwillingness to engage in the muck of 
politics made it significantly less spinnable, for both commentators of the past and present.  
Regardless, these documents represent unique voices in Taiping studies, that of the Taipings 
themselves.  They are clearly the products of multiple objective and perspectives, synthesizing 
more than just a factual account of the storyteller’s experience.  By perceiving depositions like 
those discussed as products of conscious editing and circulation, they forward a much different 
narrative than what appears within the content itself.  It is a narrative built on personal and 
political goals, a narrative hidden between the lines. 
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Conclusion: 
 Hong Tiangui Fu’s knowledge of state building was miniscule by the time of his 
execution.  He had even less experience as a ruler.  The boy’s deposition was not published as a 
result of his position, having inherited the rule of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom at the civil 
war’s close he served as a figurehead for the imminent imperial victory.  The deposition was a 
tool used by the Qing dynasty to secure the continued support of the Western world in their 
attempt at maintaining power.  It did so by showcasing the Taiping leaderhsip’s incapacity to 
rule, as perceived by the Qing court, the deposition assured Western colonial powers that their 
investments in the region would not have been safe under Taiping rule.  The inexperience of 
Taiping leaders would not have made them easy targets, rather it would have led to a collapse of 
Western involvement in the region.  The circulation of a myriad of other Taiping depositions that 
found their way into Western hands worked in the same way, reinforcing the belief that it is the 
content and the message of depositions that mattered, not just their existence.  The same issue of 
the North China Herald that featured Hong Tiangui Fu’s deposition contained statements from 
Hong Renzheng, Hong Rengan’s cousin, and the twenty-six-year-old Huang Wenying, brother to 
a member of the Taiping theocracy’s third class of kings.133  These people, while still leaders of 
the movement, were rather obscure and their exploits would have only been known to those most 
well-versed in Taiping bureaucracy. 
These depositions focused the message the Qing court aimed to get across in editing and 
publishing their contents.  Their overall tone, one of an unwillingness to rule and a carelessness 
toward their fate, reinforced the idea that the Taiping, and any future threats to Qing authority, 
                                                          
133 A wang’s class did not inherently imply value or role within the organization, 
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lacked the proper elements required for ruling China and for dealing with foreign entities.  This 
study pushes scholars to reconsider the very role that these documents played in shaping the way 
Western actors understood the justification laid out by the Qing court for continued rule.  By 
ignoring the process of translation by which depositions came to be, much of the information that 
can be gleaned from these documents is lost.  The change in the audience of Taiping depositions 
from that of previous conflicts is representative of much more than an increase in Western 
interest in East Asian affairs.  Combined with the knowledge of prominent editing processes, the 
lives of these documents act as evidence of a clear strategy to influence Western views on the 
broader realm of Qing dynasty politics. 
The fact that depositions from people like Hong Renzhang and Huang Wenying reached 
the same level of circulation as someone as important, if only ceremonially, as the Young 
Monarch, points toward the fact that the Qing valued the stories these depositions could tell.  
Hong Renzheng directed his captors to his cousin, claiming no knowledge of any internal 
Taiping affairs.  Huang Wenying, who was unwillingly promoted to a slightly more prestigious 
military role a year prior to his capture, expressed bitterness and depression in his court 
confession.  Topics of conversation spanned from the dispirited nature of current Taiping forces 
to the kingdom’s increasing inefficiency.  Huang directly attacked Li Xiucheng, stating that “the 
Zhong Wang was a very selfish man, acting in most causes for his own benefit instead of being 
zealous to promote the public good.”  He harangued Hong Rengan as well, upset that the Shield 
King did nothing to assist him after he was stabbed for remonstrating Li.134  At this point Huang 
believed that not a single capable person was loyal to the kingdom.  Toward the end of his 
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deposition, Huang declared that he was apathetic towards the course of his fate.  He had no home 
to return to and no desire to rejoin his kingdom, hoping only for the release of death.  Huang 
ended his deposition the same way Li had started his, with a cry of regret.  Huang had left his 
dead brother in a ditch without a proper burial.  In addition, he had been unable to locate his six-
year-old son, having heard nothing of him since his capture. 
While there is no evidence suggesting that these documents were forgeries, their 
publication served an important purpose for the Qing court.  These depositions reinforced the 
idea that Taiping leaders were incapable rulers, further favoring the narrative that they did not 
constitute a real threat to the dynasty.  It would be difficult to find a deposition bleaker than 
Huang Wenying’s.  The document built upon ideas originally laid out by Tian De’s supposed 
confession and furthered through Li Xiucheng’s personal retractions.  Hong Renzheng’s 
deposition, while succinct, similarly enforced an idea that the ranks of Taiping leaders were 
filled with halfhearted actors, ignorant of the movement’s larger message.  These documents did 
nothing to salvage the kingdom’s reputation or assist people like Augustus Lindley and J. S. 
Worthington in their attempts to promote the cause of the Heavenly Kingdom to their 
governments back home.  Depositions from Tian De and Li Xiucheng performed similar kinds of 
work.  Through edits by both Qing provincial officials, such as Zeng Guofan, and Qing capital 
officials, the words of Taiping leaders became tools supporting a pro-Qing dynasty narrative.  In 
the way these edits altered a deposition’s tone, and emphasized sections discussing schisms 
within Taiping leadership, differing stances on the purpose of religion, and uncertainty towards 
the movement’s end goal, officials were able to create documents that assured the nations of the 
West that they had made the right decision in giving the Qing dynasty their support over the 
heterodox practices that guided the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom.  By publishing the depositions 
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of more than just the most prominent members of the Taiping bureaucracy, Qing authorities 
augmented a clear and cohesive narrative that was easily deciphered by Western audiences.  
These published depositions reminded the West that the Taipings were not the new hope of a 
Christian China that some had thought they would be.  Depositions justified the vision that the 
Taiping Heavenly Kingdom had been a selfish, and egotistic rebellion, not an attempt by a 
legitimate power at fighting a civil war. 
The fall of the Taiping would mark the last mass struggle against Qing rule until the birth 
of the Nationalist and Communist parties in the early twentieth century.  The movement’s impact 
would carry on, as their anti-Manchu agenda, radical social policies, and self-defining attitude 
continued to reverberate inside the minds of Chinese activists and intellectuals for years to come.  
Both ruling parties would return to the words of Hong Xiuquan, Li Xuicheng, and Hong Rengan 
in their attempts at legitimizing their own political advances.  It is perhaps for this reason that 
many early scholars ignored the intricacies of how a deposition was made, choosing instead to 
focus solely on the deposition’s words and what these say about the author’s character.  In the 
midst of hot debate over which political lineage was cause for a genuine authority of rule, all that 
mattered was how a deposition defined a figure’s role.  Whether Li Xiucheng’s deposition 
showed him to be a vital member of the Taiping community, or a traitor to the movement’s 
cause, entire claims of ideological descent would have to be revised and adjusted to fit this new 
understanding.  In this way early scholars of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom viewed the 
depositions its leaders produced under the same light that contemporary commentators did.  
Early scholars took these depositions at face value instead of questioning the processes that led 
to their production; they ignored the power dynamics present between those who gave testimony 
and the officials that put them to writing.  Scholars have also ignored the reasons behind the 
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publication of these documents and the meaning they acquired through translation into English 
for circulation among Western newspapers.  These scholars worked with depositions as the static 
tools the Qing dynasty presented them as, rather than confront the impact that this propagandized 
nature might have had. 
Modern scholarship has similarly missed the broader picture when it comes to Taiping 
depositions.  By focusing on the written words of a few well-known figures, scholars continue to 
portray the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom as the effort of a few extraordinary people as opposed to 
the culmination of mass uncertainty and unrest, made up of people from a wide range of 
backgrounds and experiences, all who harbored different goals.  By the time Taiping depositions 
had reached their Western recipients, the documents had already gone through multiple stages of 
editing, even if this editing was done through translation alone.  As such, the depositions that 
became available to Western readers were not direct testimonials, but the result of multiple 
camps adjusting a narrative in hopes of actively influencing external perceptions of their 
respective goals.  To view these depositions without confronting this reality is to ignore their 
intended purpose.  Evaluating their content as purely factual, without trying to understand the 
factors that brought the document into existence and what each actor hoped to get across through 
it, creates a more one-dimensional view of those involved.  Depositions were more than the 
result of a single strain of thought.  They were the product of multiple perspectives, fighting to 
stand out, coalescing into one final narrative. 
This thesis has suggested a new angle for approaching the study of Taiping depositions.  
By emphasizing the central role played by court testimony in crafting contemporary narratives 
about the Qing court’s ability to fight internal, political opposition, as well as govern its massive 
empire, the focus shifts from the words that make up a deposition to the message it aimed to get 
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across, and the process by which this message came to be.  Through editing and the promotion of 
a specific narrative, the imperial court was able to use the very words of Taiping adherents to 
encourage the Western world to fit a specific role.  The depositions informed the West that the 
Qing dynasty was fully in control, and that this mysterious opposition was in no way the 
Christian hope that some people thought it might have been.  In order to understand what the 
members of the Taiping actually fought for, and how the Qing dynasty aimed to deal with them, 
the lifespan of a deposition must be taken into consideration.  Taiping depositions must not be 
evaluated qualitatively.  An accurate understanding of their role will not come by attempting to 
fit them into modern political agendas, but only through a historical look at their creation, edits, 
audience, and impact.  Depositions were living documents resulting from a myriad of combating 
ideals.  This thesis demonstrates that to understand the significance of these documents one must 
trace each phase of their existence, attending to the ways in which contemporary figures engaged 
with them.  In doing so, this thesis reveals a clearer picture of the purpose and function of these 
Taiping depositions in their historical context. 
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Appendix A: Maps 
 
Figure 1: The Territorial Reach of Qing empire as of 1860, provided by Stephen Platt in Autumn 
in the Heavenly Kingdom, pp. xxx – xxxi. 
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Figure 2: The Greatest Extent of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, provided by Jonathan Spence 
in God’s Chinese Son, p. 217. 
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Appendix B: Translated Depositions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Deposition of Hong Tiangui Fu, as translated and published by the North China Herald 
on July 22, 1865, p. 114. 
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Figure 4: Deposition of Tian De, as translated and published by The China Mail on August 26, 
1852, p. 138. 
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